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THE RISE AND FALL OF CHINESE TAX INCENTIVES 







China had no foreign direct investment (FDI) before 1979. Now, it is one 
of the world’s largest recipients of FDI. China has been generous to a fault 
in granting tax incentives to foreign investors. As of January 1, 2008, 
however, these FDI-specific incentives will be abolished or phased out. 
What explains the rise and fall? Were the tax incentives not effective in 
attracting FDI and promoting China’s economic growth? What are the 
implications of the Chinese experience for international tax debates? This 
article examines these questions.  
 
Part II of the Article provides an overview of the Chinese tax incentive 
regimes for FDI. It briefly discusses the creation, expansion, and 
termination of tax incentives and the key motivations at each stage. Part III 
evaluates these incentives in terms of their effectiveness, efficiency and 
fairness. Effectiveness is examined on the basis of general data about FDI 
growth in China and empirical research on investors’ reactions to Chinese 
tax incentives. The economic efficiency of tax incentives is assessed by 
looking at the positive externalities of FDI in China, the un-intended 
distortions to investment behaviour, and the extent to which the incentives 
lead to tax discrimination against local business.  The equity aspect of tax 
incentives is assessed in terms of the role of tax policy in achieving 
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redistributive justice in China. Part IV explores the implications of the 
Chinese experience for the debate on the use of tax policy in attracting 
FDI, harmful tax competition and international redistribution.  Part V 
concludes the paper. 
 
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF CHINESE TAX INCENTIVES 
A.  CHINESE INCOME TAX LAW BORN WITH FDI TAX INCENTIVES 
 
The modern income tax system in China came into existence with the 
promulgation of the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Income Tax 
Law1 (the “EJV Tax Law”) in 1980 and the Foreign Enterprise Income 
Tax (FEIT) Law in 1981.2 The former was applicable to equity joint 
ventures formed by a foreign investor and a Chinese partner (typically at 
that time a state-owned enterprise). The latter was applicable to other 
forms of FDI, including contractual joint ventures, joint explorations, and 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Both laws contained generous tax 
incentives,3 but those under the EJV Tax Law were more generous 
because  China was not very enthusiastic about foreign companies 
operating in China without a local equity partner.4 
 
                                                 
1 The Income Tax Law of the PRC Concerning Joint Ventures Using Chinese and 
Foreign Investment (the “EJV Tax Law”), passed by the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) on 10 September 1980. The implementing regulations for this law were issued by 
the Ministry of Finance on 14 December 1980. Individual Income Tax Law of the 
People’s Republic of China was also promulgated by the NPC in 1980.  
2 The Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning Foreign 
Enterprises,  promulgated by the NPC on December 13, 1981 (“FEIT Law”).  Instead of 
the flat rate of 30% of national tax as under the EJV Tax Law, the FEIT Law imposed tax 
at progressive rates, ranging from 20% to 40%. A local tax was imposed at 10% of the 
national tax, resulting in the top rate of 44 % (as opposed to 33% for equity joint 
ventures).  
3 These include tax holidays and reinvestment refunds.  See infra notes 44-47. 
4 The incentives under the FEIT were thus less generous.  For example, a tax holiday of 
three years was standard under the EJV Income Tax Law, but was available under the 
FEIT only if the investment was scheduled to operate for at least ten years in farming, 
forestry, animal husbandry or other low-profit operations.  




The two tax laws were among the first laws5 fashioned by China to 
facilitate economic reforms and foreign investment. Back in the late 
1970s, China was well aware of the fact that it was 12 hours ahead of the 
United States in time, but “decades behind in technology, infrastructure … 
and in taking its place in world affairs.”6  China wanted to catch up with 
the United States through economic development. FDI was expected to 
boost economic growth by bringing to China not only capital, but also the 
badly-needed technology, management skills, and access to international 
markets.7  However, creating a regulatory regime for FDI in general and 
tax system in particular was a daunting task. China had never had an 
income tax8 or a legal tradition familiar to foreign investors. The over 
2000 years of cultural and legal tradition led to the use of formal law as 
primarily penal law and administrative law – a set of commands 
instructing bureaucrats on how to govern the country.9 Under three 
                                                 
5 Others include The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity 
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, adopted on July 1, 1979 at the 
second session of the Fifth National People’s Congress, amended on April 4, 1990; 
Regulations for the Implementation of the Equity Joint Venture Law, promulgated by the 
State Council on September 20, 1983. 
6 Allison E. Wielobob, China’s Choice: Tax Incentives to Fund Economic Development, 
9 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 413, at 416 (1995). 
7 Huang, Yasheng,  The Benefits of FDI in a Transitional Economy: The Case of China, 
in NEW HORIZONS FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT. Paris, OECD (2003). 
8 When the modern income tax was introduced in the United States (1913) and Canada 
(1917), China was undergoing civil wars and political turmoil, which ended when the 
Communist Party declared the establishment of the People’s Republic on October 1, 
1949. After the 1949, foreign capital left China and domestic private capital was 
confiscated. Capitalism and market were incompatible with the Communist Party-led 
socialism. The absence of international investment and business transactions eliminated 
any need for any international taxation. When foreign investors were allowed back to 
China in the late 1970s, it was considered appropriate to impose an income tax on them. 
For an overview of the evolution of the Chinese tax system, see Jinyan Li, TAXATION 
IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. Praeger, New York, 1991); Alec Easson 
and Jinyan Li, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA. Kluwer, The Netherlands (1989). For an overview of the history 
of legal reform concerning foreign direct investment, see Jian Zhou, National Treatment 
in Foreign Investment Law: A Comparative Study from a Chinese Perspective, 10 Touro 
Int’l L. Rev. 39, at 50-65  (2000).  
9 For more discussion on the Chinese legal traditions, see Randall Peerenboom, 
CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW. New York: Cambridge 
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decades of Maoist governance, “law became politicized and shrunken 
symbol of governance, used instrumentally as a mere vessel for changing 
policies.”10  The combination of the legal tradition and Maoist regime left 
behind neither traditions nor institutions that would support a legal system 
appropriate for a market-driven economy.11   
 
The lack of precedence made it necessary for China to consider 
international experiences as references. Initially, foreign businessmen 
advised China to offer tax incentives to FDI.12 Chinese officials were 
aware of the tax incentives being offered by Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and other countries.13 Chinese officials 
were advised that some international experts questioned the efficiency and 
effectiveness of tax incentives,14 but they remained concerned that China 
would be unable to compete for FDI unless it offered tax incentives 
similar to those provided elsewhere.15  
 
Granting tax preferences was a key strategy from a political, cultural and 
economic perspective.16 Politically, granting tax preferences to FDI sent a 
                                                                                                                         
University Press (2002); Stanley B. Lubman, BIRD IN A CAGE – LEGAL REFORM IN 
CHINA AFTER MAO. Standord, Calif.: Stanford University Press (1999); Stanley B. 
Lubman, Looking for Law in China, Columbia J. of Asian Law 1 (2006); Hsu, C. 
Stephen, ed., UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM : ESSAYS IN HONOR 
OF JEROME A. COHEN. New York : New York University Press (2003); Xin Ren, 
TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADITION: LAW, STATE, AND 
SOCIAL. New York, Greenwood Press 1997.  
10 Lubman (2006), ibid., at 5. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See Richard Pomp and Stanley Surrey, The Tax Structure of the People’s Republic of 
China, 20 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 at 12 (1979). 
13 See Liu, Longheng, INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE TAX LAW. Beijing University 
Press (1986), at 240 (in Chinese). 
14 Pomp and Surrey, supra note 12 at 12. 
15 Ibid.   
16 This promise was first made in the 1979 Equity Joint Venture Law, which was the first 
piece of legislation governing FDI since the inception of reforms. Just as punitive rates 
under the previous system were the legacy of policies that reflected past hostility toward 




clear signal to foreign investors China’s desire for their investment. This 
signalling effect was historically important because China suffered from 
serious image problems due to its previous hostile policies to foreign 
investors. The choice of the very word in the Chinese language, “you hui” 
(preferences) for tax incentives conveyed a positive message. This 
message was widely disseminated and viewed as a key to the success of 
efforts to promote foreign investment.17  
 
Offering generous tax preferences to foreign investors was also consistent 
with Chinese hospitality and respect for friendship. Tax preferences were 
presented as gifts or rewards to overseas investors. The Confucian way of 
dealing with foreigners was to be "generous with gifts without calculating 
the value of tribute and to grant them honours without making heavy 
demands."19 The Chinese believed that by showing generosity and 
hospitality they could exert moral influence on non-Chinese and lead them 
to "participate in the benefits of (Chinese) civilisation."20 The grant of tax 
preferences is associated with the Chinese respect or dependence on 
relationships (or “guanxi” in Chinese) because exchanges of gifts are an 
important practice in establishing and retaining relationships. Whether 
foreign investors actually came to China or even expressed an interest in 
doing business with the country, the Chinese claimed them as friends. 
Investors could interpret tax preferences as reciprocation for their friendly 
acts of investing in China.21 This relationship-building effect of tax 
preferences may have a special appeal to overseas Chinese investors. 
Some of them may have been affected by the Communist Party's previous 
harsh policies and may regard gestures such as granting preferential 
treatment as implied apologies and compensation for past ill-treatment. 
Some overseas Chinese have a strong attachment to their ancestral land 
                                                                                                                         
foreign and private capital, in new Equity Joint Venture Law was testament to a 
favourable policy change. 
17 Zhaodong Jiang, China’s Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy, Culture and 
Modern Concepts, 18 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 549 at 611 (2000). 
18 Ibid., at 618. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., at 630.  
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and returned to their native villages and hometowns for sentimental as 
well as business reasons. They felt welcome when local government 
presented them with gifts, including tax preferences.22  
 
The use of tax preferences was also motivated by pragmatic reasons. 
China was aware of its economic attractiveness to foreign investors: cheap 
labour, rich natural resources, and a potentially huge domestic market. It 
also knew that it had limited resources to develop the necessary 
infrastructure. As such, funding FDI through tax preferences23 (i.e., 
foregoing the potential tax revenue should FDI actually come and make 
profit) seemed a good strategy. In addition to solving the potential cash 
problem, granting tax preferences was also more expedient and may have 
compensated for the lack of an ideal investment environment.24 It would 
                                                 
22 Ibid. This emphasis on building relationships through gift exchanges created some 
problems. Local officials preferred to broad powers in granting tax preferences and to 
outperform other local officials in competing for the investment, resulting in regional tax 
competition and disregard of centrally-made tax policy. The tax preferences presumably 
played an important role in attracting overseas Chinese investors. Much of the Chinese 
FDI inflow consists of capital from three ethnically Chinese economies: Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Macao. Hong Kong and Taiwan have been among the top source countries 
of FDI inflow to China.  FDI from these three sources accounted for 59.3 % of China’s 
total FDI inflows between 1978 and 1999. Ethnic Chinese capital suppliers in Asia, North 
America and other parts of the world also contributed to the rapid growth of FDI in 
China. See Huang (1999), supra note 7, at 36.  
23 See Wielobob, supra note 6. 
24 For more discussion on these effects, see Richard E. Caves, MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. Cambridge University press, Cambridge 
(1996); John Dunning, Investment Incentives throughout Asia, in EXPLAINING 
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION. Unwin Hyman, London (1988); -----, 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. Addison-
Wesley, New York (1993); Eckhard Janeba, Attracting FDI in a Politically Risky World, 
43 (4) International Economic Rev. 1127-55 (2002); Thomas Porcano and Charles E. 
Price, The Effect of Government Tax and Nontax Incentives on Foreign Direct 
Investment, 4 Multinational Business Rev. 9-19 (1996); Robert J. Rolfe and Richard A. 
White, Investors’ Assessment of the Importance of Tax Incentives in Locating Foreign 
Export-Oriented Investment: An Exploratory Study, 14 The J. of the American Taxation 
Association  39-57 (1992); Dennis Rondinelli and William J. Brupitt,  Do Government 
Incentives Attract and Retain International Investment? A Study of Foreign-Owned Firms 
in North Carolina, 33 (2) Policy Sciences 181-205 (2000); and Louise Single, Tax 
Holidays and Firm’s Subsidiary Location Desires, 21 (2) The J. of the American Taxation 
Association 17-34 (1999).  




take time for China to develop the necessary institutional environment in 
terms of property rights protection and government policy creditability.   
 
 
 B. THE RISE  
During the 1980s and 1990s, special preferential tax regimes for FDI 
experienced a huge boom. A major aspect of the Chinese FDI policy is 
development region by region. The strategy is to concentrate limited 
resources for the improvement of infrastructure in small geographic areas. 
Another aspect of the policy is to encourage export, which could not only 
earn foreign currency, but also keep FDI separate from the domestic 
market.  
In 1980, China established four “special economic zones” (SEZs) along 
the south coast (i.e. Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong 
Province and close to Hong Kong, and Xiamen in Fujian Province across 
from Taiwan)25 in order to attract investors in general and investors from 
Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan in particular.93 The Central Government 
allowed these zones to experiment with reforms in governance and 
regulations and granted additional tax preferences to FDI in these zones.26 
The hope was that foreign capital would turn a small number of sites into 
an overnight success story. The government could then use the success of 
the SEZs for a variety of political and economic purposes.27  
                                                 
25 For discussions of Chinese SEZs, see Kevin B. Bucknall, CHINA AND THE OPEN 
DOOR POLICY. Routledge (November 1990) 143-67; Norman Y.T. Ng, From Special 
Economic Zones to the Coastal Open Cities: A Strategy for Modernization of China, in 
Tien-tung Hsueh & Tun-oy Woo, REFORMS OF THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE IN 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, IN CHINA: MODERNIZATION IN THE 
1980S 231 (Joseph Y.S. Cheng ed., 1989). 
26 See Provisional Regulations of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 
Regarding the Reduction of and Exemption from Enterprises Income Tax and 
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax in the Special Economic Zones and the 
Fourteen Coastal Cities, issued by the State Council on November 15, 1984.  
27 See Jiang, supra note 17; Ng, supra note 25, at 448-49; Bucknall, ibid., at 144. 
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The immediate success of the SEZs led China to designate 14 coastal 
cities as "Coastal Open Cities" in 1984. Certain areas of these cities were 
designated as “economic and technological development areas" and others 
as “old urban district”.28 Tax incentives in economic and technological 
development areas were very close to those in SEZs, but incentives in 
coastal open cities were less generous.29  A third wave of special areas 
were designated in 1985 -- "coastal economic open regions", consisting of 
urban and rural areas in the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas, and the South 
Fujian region.30 These regions were generally better positioned than the 
rest of the country in attracting FDI as they had geographic advantages, a 
relatively more developed industrial, technological and infrastructure base 
than the rest of the country, and were the ancestral home to most Overseas 
Chinese.31  The tax preferences in the SEZs remained the most generous. 
To allow exactly the same preferential treatment in non-SEZ areas was 
thought to lead to unhealthy competition and divert attention from SEZs.32   
In addition to special regions, special FDI projects or activities received 
preferential tax treatment. The two most well-known types of projects 
were export-oriented33 and technologically-advanced.34 Reinvestment in 
                                                 
28  The fourteen coastal cities were Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Yantai, 
Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, 
and Beihai.  
29 See Jiang, supra note 17. For example, a reduced 15 % tax rate was applicable to  
EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs in “old urban districts” that were technology or know-how 
intensive and had an investment exceeding U.S. $ 30 million and a long investment 
recovery period, or the projects related to energy, transport or port construction.   
30 Jiang, supra note 17. The list of coastal economic open regions was later expanded to 
cover over 150 cities and counties in 8 provinces. See Notice of the State Council 
Concerning the Enlargement of the Scope of Coastal Economic Open Regions], 1988 
Fagui Huibian 446. As a result, they reach the East Liaoning and East Shangdong 
Peninsulas. 
31 These regions had been the main bases of China's traditional export industries like 
textiles, handicrafts, light industry and native products.   
32 Jiang, supra note 17, at 575. 
33 "Export-oriented enterprises" were defined as enterprises that produce goods mainly 
(over 70%) for export and maintain a net positive foreign exchange balance at the end of 
the year. 




either type of enterprises was eligible for a full refund of the tax paid on 
the reinvested profit. Other preferred investments include infrastructure 
projects,35 “productive” activities, agriculture and animal husbandry. 
Services and passive investment were not encouraged. 
The formal tax discrimination between EJVs and other forms of FDI 
seemed to make little sense by the end of the 1980s. By then, the majority 
of FDI was either located in special areas or involving preferred 
investment projects, receiving similar tax preferences, irrespective of the 
form of the investment.  In 1991, the EJV Income Tax and the FEIT were 
consolidated into the “Foreign Investment Enterprise and Foreign 
Enterprise Income Tax” (or FIE Tax).36  Existing tax incentives granted by 
way of administrative decrees were incorporated into the new law.  
 
After 1991, new tax incentives continued to be granted. The Pudong New 
District was created in the City of Shanghai37 in order to develop Shanghai 
into a world-class financial centre.  Other “special” regions included 
western regions, North-East regions, border cities, bonded zones, tourist 
and resort areas, "High and New Technology Industrial Development 
Areas".38  The rise of special areas away from the coastal regions 
                                                                                                                         
34 "Technologically-advanced enterprises" were enterprises which, with advanced 
technology provided by foreign investors, are able to develop new products, or upgrade 
existing products, and therefore earn foreign exchange through exports or import 
substitution.   
35 Irrespective of the location of the investment, the tax rate was reduced to 15% for 
equity joint ventures in port and berth construction projects. New projects scheduled to 
operate for 15 years or more were eligible for a 10-year tax holiday (a 5-year exemption 
followed by a 5-year 50% reduction in tax). The tax holiday might be extended upon 
approval by the Ministry of Finance.  Withholding tax on distributions of profits was 
waived, so was the local income tax.  See Jiang, supra note 17.   
36 The nominal tax rate was 33% (consisted of 30% national and 3% local). For an 
overview of the tax implications for foreign investors, see Stephen Curley & Darren 
Fortunato, Tax Considerations for Investors in China: A Preliminary Look, 20 N.C. J. 
Int’l L. & Com. Rec. 531 (1995);  Jinyan Li, Tax Implications of Doing Business in 
China, 43 Canadian Tax J. 75 (1995); and Kenny Lin, Income Taxation and Foreign 
Direct Investment in China, 25 Int’l Tax J. 78 (1999). 
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effectively made the special tax regimes in the coastal region less special. 
So, the coastal regions created new types of special zones to remain 
competitive, including bonded zones, free trade zones, high and new 
industrial development zones, Taiwan investment zones, Singapore-
Suzhou industrial park, tourist and resort zones.39 By the end of the 1990s, 
there were over 100 special areas. As a result of these tax incentives, the 
effective tax rate for FIEs was about 10 percentage point lower than that 
for domestic enterprises. 
 
C. THE FALL 
 
So long as the FDI did not compete with Chinese firms, the most effective 
way of using the tax system to attract FDI was to give it only to foreign 
investors.40  By the turn of the century, especially after China’s accession 
to the WTO in 2001, however, the FDI tax policy was under close scrutiny 
and heatedly debated. The negative impact of such policy became more 
serious, while the positive signalling, compensation and hospitality effects 
wore off as China’s investment conditions improved over time. The 
promulgation of the Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) Law41 on March 16, 
2007 officially declared the end of the existing FDI tax incentive regime.42 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 As discussed below, such differential policy resulted in round tripping. However, round 
tripping was presumably not considered a serious problem because China did not make it 
too difficult for those who did the round tripping. The alternative would have been 
applying tax incentives to all taxpayers, which would be costly in terms of revenue.  
41 Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, (EIT Law) promulgated 
by the National People’s Congress, March 16, 2007. This law replaces the two existing 
enterprise income taxes as of January 1, 2008. The Chinese text of the law is available at 
the State Administration of Taxation web site: www.chinatax.gov.cn. An unofficial 
English translation is available at www.kpmg.com.cn and www.lehmanlaw.com. For a 
discussion of this new law, see Jinyan Li, Fundamental Enterprise Income Tax Reform in 
China: Motivations and Major Changes, Bulletin for International Fiscal Doc. (2007) 
(forthcoming). 
42 The elimination of existing tax preferences and the increase in the general tax rate for 
foreign-investment enterprises (FIEs) were feared for discouraging FDI in China.  To 
ease this fear,  the new law allows existing FIEs to continue to pay as the lower rate of 
15% or 24% until 2013 or to enjoy other types of tax preferences (such as tax holidays) 
until the specified time period is over. For existing FIEs that have not started enjoying the 





III. EFFECTIVENESS, EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY 
IMPLICATIONS OF TAX INCENTIVES    
A. OVERVIEW 
The tax incentives available to FDI are clearly in the nature of tax 
expenditures.43 They are assessed below in terms of the associated revenue 
loss, their effectiveness in attracting FDI to China, and their efficiency and 
equity implications in China.   
For the purposes of this assessment, Chinese tax incentives are grouped 
into the following categories: tax holidays,44 tax rate reductions in special 
areas45 or for profit from specified activities,46 and refund for reinvestment 
                                                                                                                         
tax holidays because they have not yet made any profits, the tax holiday will start in 
2008. In addition, State Council may decide to grandfather existing tax preferences for 
newly-established hi-tech enterprises that receive priority support from the State and are 
located in special zones (e.g. SEZs, Pudong New Area in Shanghai, etc.), as well as tax 
preferential policies for enterprises the development of which is encouraged in certain 
regions (such as the Western Region). EIT Law, Article 57.   
43 The seminal works on this topic are Stanley Surrey, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: 
THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press 
(1973); and Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel, TAX EXPENDITURES. Cambridge, 
MA. Harvard University Press (1985). 
44 The standard tax holiday was three years (one year exemption and two years half 
reduction), starting in the first profit-making year. An extended holiday of ten years was 
available to FIEs engaged in low-profit operation s in farming and forestry or located in 
remote, economically underdeveloped areas. 
45 FIEs located in SEZs and some other special areas were taxable at a reduced rate of 
15% (as opposed to the general rate of 30%). Local tax was waived. The tax holiday was 
extended to five years for “productive” enterprises (those engaged in manufacturing, 
communication and transport, agriculture, forestry, and animal husbandry). 
46 Additional tax incentives were available to export-oriented FIEs and technologically-
intensive FIEs, whether or not they were located in a special area.  On top of any tax 
exemption and reduction to which a taxpayer was entitled, the tax rate was reduced to 
15% in general and 10% in SEZs.  Reinvestment in either type of enterprises was eligible 
for a full refund of the tax paid on the reinvested profit.  The tax rate was reduced to 10% 
for FIEs in ETDAs or other areas where the enterprise income tax rate was already 15%. 
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in China.47 They are all profit-based tax incentives and, as such, do not 
generally benefit the start-up companies that have losses in the initial 
stages, or innovative companies that incur significant research and 
development expenses. While most tax incentives were targeted at active 
business income, some were applicable to investment income, albeit 
received by foreign investor in the form of dividends, interest or 
royalties.48 
Chinese tax treaties49 generally preserve the effect of domestic incentives 
through a tax sparing clause. A tax sparing credit is found in treaties with 
most capital exporting countries (with the notable exception of the United 
States).50  The effect of the tax sparing credit is that Chinese taxes waived 
or reduced under Chinese law51 are deemed to have been paid for the 
                                                 
47 Tax is refunded to the investor if Chinese profits were reinvested in China. The general 
rate of refund was 40 percent. In certain special cases, the rate was raised to 100 per cent.  
In SEZs, refund for reinvestment was 100% as opposed to 40%. 
48 The nominal 20 per cent withholding tax was reduced to zero on dividends (or 
distribution of profits) by FIEs, to zero or a lower rate for interest (mostly on loans 
extended to Chinese state-owned banks) and royalties paid in respect of transfer of 
advanced technology.  
49 Since its first tax treaty with Japan in 1983, China has developed an impressive 
network of bilateral tax treaties (85 treaties by the end of 2006). These treaties generally 
follow the OECD Model Treaty and incorporate some elements of the UN Model Treaty 
in order to protect source-based taxation. For a list of China’s treaties, see the State 
Administration of Taxation’s website: 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n480462/n480513/n481009/index.html.  Because Hong 
Kong and Macao are “special administrative regions” and enjoy tax autonomy, Mainland 
China concluded a “tax arrangement” with each of special region to resolve any potential 
double taxation problem. 
50 The text of all of China’s tax treaties is available at the State Administration of 
Taxation’s website: http://www.chinatax.gov.cn.  The tax sparing credit in some treaties 
has been phased out. For example, the phasing out of the tax sparing credit under the 
China-United Kingdom Treaty was provided under Article 5(1) of the Protocol concluded 
in 1996 to amend the China-UK tax treaty (1984). 
51 A typical tax sparing credit clause makes specific references to the Chinese legislation 
that grants the tax reduction or exemption. Treaties concluded before 1991 refer to the 
EVJ Income Tax (1980) and the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax (1981) and similar 
subsequent provisions that are agreed by the competent authorities to be of a substantially 
similar character to those stipulated the treaty. The tax incentives granted under the FIE 
Tax (1991) have been considered to be of a substantially similar.  Because the new 




purposes of determining the credit available in the other treaty country. 
For example, Under the China-Canada treaty,52 Chinese withholding tax 
on dividends is deemed to be 5% of the dividends paid even though the 
withholding tax rate is actually zero.53 
 
B. REVENUE LOSS 
 
The direct cost of the FDI tax incentives is the amount of revenue loss.  
China has not published any official estimates on this cost or any other 
types of tax expenditures.54 The amount is believed to be significant; one 
scholar thought the amount of revenue loss was as high as the amount of 
revenue collected.55  In 2003, while FIEs contributed 33.4% of national 
industrial output, they paid only 20.9 percent of total taxes.56   
                                                                                                                         
Enterprise Income Tax Law (2007) retains the reductions and exemptions of withholding 
tax on dividends, interest and royalties available under the 1991 tax law, it should be 
clear that the tax sparing credit applies to the new law.   
52 For example, Article 21(2) of the China-Canada tax treaty: 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n480462/n480513/n481009/1017131.html). 
53 As far as Canadian tax is concerned, Chinese withholding tax on dividends is creditable 
only in cases where the dividends are paid out of “taxable surplus” as opposed to “exempt 
surplus”. Because China is a designated treaty country, dividends paid by FIEs to 
Canadian shareholders are mostly exempt dividends. As such, the tax sparing credit for 
dividends is of limited practical effect. 
54 The Ministry of Finance is in the process of establishing a team of experts to study the 
issue of tax expenditures and develop models for assessments.   
55 Quoqiang Ma, China’s Current Tax Expenditure System: Issues and Policy Options, in 
Hana Polackova Brixi, Christian M.A. Valenduc, and Zhicheng. L. Swifft, eds. TAX 
EXPENDITURES—SHEDDING LIGHT ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
THROUGH THE TAX SYSTEM: LESSONS FROM DEVELOPED AND 
TRANSITION ECONOMIES. Washington D.C. The World Bank  190-202 at 197 
(2004). Ma wrote that  in terms of scale, “the cost of current tax expenditures has 
reached—and even exceeded—the amount of total tax revenue collected by the 
benchmark system. … The cost of income tax expenditures exceeds the amount of 
income tax revenue.”  Chinese scholars have increasingly argued that the tax incentive 
regimes in China are generous to a fault. See for example, Chun Chen, Thoughts on 
China’s Foreign Tax Incentives, no.7 Int’l Taxation in China 31-33 (in Chinese) (2005); 
Zhiyuan Li, Building A Tax Expenditure System Suitable for China, No.3, Taxation 
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As discussed in more detail below, tax incentives also have indirect costs 
resulted from creating  significant opportunities for illicit behaviour by tax 
administrators and taxpayers. The loss of economic efficiencies due to the 
discriminative tax treatment of local businesses and barriers to fair 
competition is also expected to be significant.  
 
C.  EFFECTIVENESS IN ATTRACTING FDI 
There is a rich body of literature examining the factors that may affect an 
investor’s decision as to where to invest.57 According to the surveys of 
investors in the 1960s to 1980s, “tax exemption is like a dessert; it is good 
                                                                                                                         
Research J.  40-42 (in Chinese) (2006); Jiansuo Lu, A Brief Discussion on the Sources of 
and Preventive Measures for Tax Revenue Loss, No. 9 Tax Research J.  61-64 (in 
Chinese) (1999); and Zhiqiang Tang, Defects and Adjustments of Foreign Tax Incentives, 
No.10 Int’l Taxation in China 26-27 (in Chinese) (2005); and Jun Ye, Discussion of the 
Need to Keep or Abolish Foreign Tax Incentives, no.11 Int’l Taxation in China 28-29 (in 
Chinese) (2005).  
56  Xue Sun, Possible Delay of Consolidating Enterprise Income Tax Laws to 2007, 21st 
Century Economics Tribune (January 10, 2005) at 6. See also SAT website for the tax 
statistics: www.chinatax.gov.cn (in Chinese).  
57 For an overview of the literature, see Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S Tax Treatment of 
Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries: A Policy Analysis, 35 Geo. 
Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 265 (2003); Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct 
Investments and Growth: Using the Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 
Va. Tax Rev. 161 (2003); Avi Nov, Tax Incentives to Entice Foreign Direct Investment: 
Should There Be a Distinction Between Developed Countries and Developing Countries? 
23 Va. Tax Rev. 685  (2004); ------ The Bidding War” to Attract Foreign Direct 
Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 835  (2006). For economic 
literature, see David Wheeler & Ashoka Mody, International Investment Location 
Decisions: The Case of U.S. Firms, 33 J. Int'l Econ. 57 (1992); James R. Hines reached a 
contrary conclusion: Tax Policies and the Activities of Multinational Corporations 8 
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5589, 1996). See also Michael P. 
Devereaux & Harold Freeman, The Impact of Tax on Foreign Direct Investment: 
Empirical Evidence and the Implications for Tax Integration Schemes, 2 Int'l Tax & Pub. 
Fin. 86 (1995); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Foreign Direct Investment in a 
World of Multiple Taxes 8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8440, 
2001).   




to have, but it does not help very much if the meal is not there.”58 In other 
words, tax incentives are relevant, but not significant factors. At the same 
time, a survey of government officials ranked tax incentives as key factors 
in attracting FDI.59 Evidence from the mid-1980s to the end of 1990s 
showed, however, that tax incentives “do affect the locational decisions of 
some investors some of the time”.60  Tax incentives are considered to have 
“a small but significant” influence in attracting FDI to developing 
countries.61  
China has experienced a tremendous growth in FDI inflow during the past 
three decades and62 is the largest recipient of FDI among developing 
countries. During the same period of time, China has offered generous tax 
incentives to FDI.63 These two facts tend to lead to the conclusion that 
China’s tax incentives seemed to have played a crucial role in attracting 
foreign investment.64 Most Chinese scholars consider tax incentives to be 
                                                 
58 Jacques Morisset and Neda Pirnia, How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect Foreign 
Direct Investment: A Review, The World  Bank and International Finance Corporation 
Foreign Investment Advisory Service (December 2000), at 5.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See A.J. Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, Part I: Recent Trends 
and Countertrends, 55 Bull. For Int’l Fiscal Documentation 266 (2001); A.J. Easson, 
TAXATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: AN INTRODUCTION (The 
Netherlands, Kluwer) (1999); and McDaniel, supra note 57.   
62 The annual value of FDI actually utilized in China is listed as follows: USD 4.1 billion 
in 1979-84, 1.9 billion in 1985, 34.8 billion in 1990, 37.5 billion in 1995, USD40.7 
billion in 2000, and USD 60.3 billion in 2005.  
Source: China statistical Year Book (2006): 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/html/R1814E.xls ,visited on July 10, 2007.  
63 United Nations, World Investment Report 2006 (New York and Geneva 2006), 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf.   
64 Michael Littlewood, Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom? 26 Mith. J. Int’l L. 411 
(2004-5) at 475. See also Francesco D’Muri and Anna Marenzi, Tax Systems and Tax 
Reforms in South and East Asia: Features and Effectives of Corporation Taxation on FDI 
(July 2005), available at http://www.unipv.it/websiep/wp/409.pdf (visited September 1, 
2007), at 27. 
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a relevant factor.65 Some Chinese scholars66 attribute the huge leap in the 
early 1990s, in part, to the codification67 of the existing tax incentives and 
the uniform treatment of all forms of FDI.68 International scholars 
generally share this assessment. For example, Tseng and Zebregs69 list 
preferential investment policies (including tax preferences) among the 
factors that have been most important in influencing FDI in China.70  Tung 
and Cho went further, arguing that tax incentives are effective in attracting 
                                                 
65 See, for example, Gang Li and Guangyi Chen, Direction of Chinese International Tax 
Law under WTO Principles, in Jianwen Liu, ed. FINANCE AND TAX LAW REVIEW 
VOL. 8. Beijing, China: Law Press China, (2006) 281, at 298 (in Chinese). 
66 See Changjie Xia and Zhu Li, Tax Incentives and FDI: Theoretical Analysis and 
China’s Experience, No. 9 International Taxation in China, 53 (in Chinese) (2004). 
67 Other favourable tax developments include the conclusion of a bilateral tax treaty over 
40 countries that are the main sources of FDI in China, including Japan (1983), the 
United States (1984), France (1984), the United Kingdom (1984), Belgium (1985), 
Germany (1985), Malaysia (1985), Norway (1986), Denmark (1986), Singapore (1986), 
Finland (1986), Canada (1986), Sweden (1986), New Zealand (1986), Thailand (1986), 
Italy (1986), The Netherlands (1987), Poland (1988), Australia (1988), Switzerland 
(1990), Cyprus (1990), Spain (1990), Romania (1991), Austria (1991), Brazil (1991), 
Luxembourg (1994), Korea (1994), India (1994), Mauritius (1994). This list of tax 
treaties is posted on the SAT’s website: www.chinatax.gov.cn. 
68 In China, tax legislation includes tax “laws” (“fa lu”) enacted by the National People’s 
Congress (the legislature), “administrative regulations” (fa gui) promulgated by the State 
Council (the government branch), as well as administrative rules introduced by the State 
Administration of Taxation (SAT), which is a ministry of the State Council. From the 
beginning of economic reforms, China has tried to promulgate “laws” to govern FDI and 
other international activities. Examples are the Joint Venture Law (1979) and the Joint 
Venture Income Tax Law (1980). In contrast, domestic activities are regulated by 
“administrative regulations” or “administrative rules”.  Examples are those governing the 
tax incentives for SEZs and other special areas until 1991. Codifying these tax incentive 
measures into a “law” symbolizes the maturity of government policy, and thus creates 
more confidence of taxpayers in the certainty of the measures. 
69 Wanda Tseng and Harm Zebregs, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some Lessons 
for Other Countries, IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/02/03 (2003).  
70 For a similar conclusion, see Leonard K. Cheng and Yum K. Kwan, What are the 
Determinants of the Location of Foreign Direct Investment? The Chinese Experience, 20 
J. of Int’l Economics, 375-400 (2000).  




FDI to China.71  There is also an apparent correlation between FDI and the 
Chinese location-specific and activity-specific tax incentives.72 Over 70% 
of FDI has been in manufacturing.73 In 2005, 58.3% of total export was by 
enterprises receiving FDI (i.e., foreign investment enterprises or FIEs).74 
Over 80% of FDI in China was invested in the coastal areas.75 It is likely 
that most FDI projects enjoy some tax incentives.   
However, using the FDI growth as a basis for asserting the effectiveness of 
tax incentives is unreliable as it fails to identify the amount of  FDI inflow 
that would not have occurred in the absence of the tax incentives. On the 
other hand, there is no available data showing the relevance of various 
factors, including tax incentives, in influencing the locational decisions 
foreign investors. It seems that more weight was given to tax incentives 
than what actually happened. For example, the Shanghai Pudong 
                                                 
71 Samuel Tung and Stella Cho, The Impact of Tax Incentives on Foreign Direct 
Investment in China, 9(2) J. of Int’l Accounting, Auditing & Taxation 105-135 (2000).  
See also Littlewood, supra note 64. 
72 Guangping Lei, Implications of Enterprise Income Tax Reform for Utilization of FDI, 
no.4, Taxation Research J.  35 at 36 (in Chinese) (2006). See also Zhang and Liu, infra 
note 86; and Xia and Li, supra note 66.  
73  See China Statistics Year Book (2006), 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/html/R1817E.xls, visited on July 11, 2007.    
74 Ibid. In comparison, the share of total industrial output by FIEs was less than 35% of 
the national industrial output, which means that FIEs export more than Chinese-funded 
enterprises. See Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Sylvie Demurger, Foreign Direct 
Investment and Economic Growth: Theory and Application to China, 4(2) Review of 
Development Economics  140-155 (2000). 
75 Xiaojuan Jiang, Yingxin Wang, and Laike Yang, A Study of the Gradual Shift of 
Foreign Investment,  (37), no.5 Chinese Economy  19-24 (September-October 2004).  
Chen, Chun Reflections on the matter of Foreign Tax Preferences, No.7 Int’l Taxation in 
China  31-33 (in Chinese) (2005). On the other hand, there are obvious non-tax factors 
that are attractive to FDI: the special areas in the East Coast generally have a longer 
history of open to investors, better infrastructure, more open, transparent and efficient 
local government, better educated workforce and higher purchasing power. Tai-Yuen 
Hon, Che-Cheong Poon & Kai-Yin Woo, Regional Distribution of Foreign Direct 
Investment in China: A Multivariate Data Analysis of Major Socioeconomic Variables, 
(38) No.2, The Chinese Economy at 56-87 (March-April 2005) (a fundamental 
determinant of regional disparity in FDI in China during 1998–2003 was the overall 
socioeconomic environment in the administrative regions).  
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experience has been offered as proof that tax incentives worked, while in 
fact almost all the real investment in terms of factories was outside the 
Pudong zone and paid no Chinese tax anyway as a result of transfer 
pricing.76  The apparent correlation between the location of FDI in China’s 
coastal areas and the location-specific tax incentives is also misleading as 
evidence of the effectiveness of tax incentives. The general investment 
environment in coastal areas has been more inductive to investment than 
the rest of China.  Since most exports are competitive on labour costs and 
low-level of regulation regarding pollution, labour protection, health and 
safety controls, it's possible that labour-intensive, export-oriented 
investment would have taken place anyway. 
According to a survey of companies in the European Union about the 
factors influencing their decision to invest in China,77 91% of investors put 
investment incentives on medium or higher position when deciding to 
invest, and 41% considered incentives as highly important factors.78  To 
the extent that tax incentives influence a foreign investor’s decision, the 
influence seems to vary in terms of the time of investment, origin of the 
FDI, the size of the investor, and the investor’s strategy in China.79   
Early years.  Generally speaking, tax incentives were more relevant 
during the early years when the signalling, compensation and cultural 
effect was most evident. Once the tax incentive regime was firmly in 
place, it became a constant factor and had much less influence. For 
example, following China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, the fate of FDI 
tax incentives was publicly debated in China,80 but, in spite of the 
                                                 
76 This example is based on conversations between Rick Krever and Chinese tax officials 
while during one of his trips to China. 
77 Wenhua Shan, Law and Foreign Investment in China: General Role of Law and 
Substantive Issues (part one), 2 Manchester J. Int’l Econ. L. 41  (2005). 
78 Ibid., at 54. 
79 This is consistent with the finding by Easson that once a multinational enterprise has 
decided to invest in a given region, then tax incentives can influence the location of the 
FDI within the region; Easson (2001), supra note 61, at 267.   
80 Li and Chen, supra note 65; Hong Guo, Principles and Directions of China’s Foreign 
Tax Incentives, No. 11 Tax Research J. 14-18 (in Chinese) (2005); Guoqiang Ma, Current 
Chinese Tax Incentives: Problems and Suggestions, Tax Research J. 34-38 (in Chinese) 




uncertainty and possible elimination of the incentives, FDI continued to 
increase in China.  
Home country taxation.  In terms of the origin of FDI, Chinese tax 
incentives are more attractive to investors based in low-tax jurisdictions. 
These investors stand to benefit from the Chinese tax incentives as 
Chinese tax is the only tax payable. But of course, some low-tax countries 
(such as Samoa and British Virgin Islands) act as funnels for capital from 
high-tax developed countries. As we will explain below, tax havens have 
been used by Chinese investors for round-tripping funds.  To that extent, 
there has been no increase in investment but mere recharacterisation of the 
source to avoid Chinese tax.   
Investors from “exemption” jurisdictions seem to react more positively to 
Chinese tax incentives than those from “credit” jurisdictions.81 For 
example, companies from continental Europe (typically with exemption 
system that does not tax foreign-source business income) place higher 
importance on incentives than their counterparts in the United Kingdom (a 
credit system). 82 Investors from credit jurisdictions, especially those that 
do not grant tax sparing credit (notably the United States) maybe 
indifferent to the Chinese tax incentives if they have to distribute profits to 
the United States83 or channel their FDI through a tax haven entity.84 It is 
                                                                                                                         
(2003); Jiang Liang, Problems with China’s Current Tax Incentives for Science and 
Technology, No. 10, Tax Research J.   35-38 (in Chinese) (2001).  
81 For a case study of the relevance of home country taxation, see Chad Leechor and Jack 
M. Mintz, Taxing Foreign Income in Capital-Importing Countries: Thailand’s 
Perspective, Country Economics Department, The World Bank (September 1990), WPS 
499. See Timonthy J.  Goodspeed, Taxation and FDI in Developed and Developing 
Countries (2004), available at http://isp-
aysps.gsu.edu/academics/conferences/con2004/goodspeed.pdf. (reviewing the literature 
on the theoretical incentive effects of host-country taxes on FDI coming from tax credit 
countries). 
82 Shan, supra note 77, at 55. 
83 There seems to be only very a small difference in the impact of investment incentives 
resulting from territorial versus worldwide system. See Goodspeed, supra note 81.    
84 Lei, supra note 72, at 36. 
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possible that a portion of the FDI from Japan is attributable to the tax 
sparing credit under the China-Japan tax treaty.85  
Size of investors.    Large multinational enterprises are found to be less 
influenced by Chinese tax incentives than small and medium sized firms.86 
Presumably, multinationals are more interested in the long-term 
investment environment than the short-term effect of tax incentives. They 
can use tax planning techniques to achieve an effective tax rate target 
which is much lower than the formal tax rate.  Large multinational 
companies are also more likely to receive special tax treatments because of 
their bargaining positions. Small investors are generally more responsive 
to tax incentives.87 
Business strategy in China.  Investors who are lured to China by its 
domestic market, such as retail, telecom, banking, services, and certain 
consumer products are less affected by tax incentives. FDI in the 
extractive sectors is located in China because of the natural resources. 
“Real” long-term investment in human capital and technological 
innovation rather than assembly manufacturing does not generate 
immediate taxable income so tax holidays or tax rate reductions have no 
                                                 
85 For further research, see Celine and Andrew Delios, (2005); Fiscal Incentives in 
Developing Countries and FDI: Tax Sparing Matters, available at 
http://www.afse.fr/docs/congres_2005/docs2005/Azemar.pdf (visited November 16, 
2007); Celine Azemar, Rodolphe Desbordes and Jean-Louis Mucchielli, Do Tax Sparing 
Agreements Contribute to the Attraction of FDI in Developing Countries? at 
ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/Bla04047.pdf; and James Hines, Jr., Tax 
Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries, NBER Working Paper 6728 
(1998), at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6728. 
86 Yang Zhang and Hui Liu, Analysis of the Impact of Taxation on FDI, No.4, Taxation 
Research J.  39  at 41 (in Chinese) (2006).  Shan, supra note 77, also made this 
conclusion in his empirical study.  Shan notes that tax incentives were regarded as an 
important FDI location factor on the basis of the number of investors surveyed. However, 
the “widely held assumption that western investors do not care much about incentives” 
remains valid as it reflects the opinions and experiences of large multinationals, which 
accounts for the vast majority among international investors in terms of the amount of 
their investment, but a tiny minority in terms of their number. 
87 For studies on this topic, see E.J. Coyne, An Articulated Analysis Model for FDI 
Attraction into Developing Countries,  Florida; Nova Southeastern University (1994), 
reviewed by Morisset and Pirnia, supra note 58. 




effect on it.  In fact, the lion’s share of FDI in car manufacturing or other 
types of long-term -projects are not actually located in the special areas 
that benefit from tax incentives, but in places where there is a strong 
existing manufacturing base (Tianjin, Wuhan, Shanghai, Shenyang, and 
Chongqing”.88  In contrast, investors looking for low-cost manufacturing 
bases tend to react more positively to Chinese tax incentives. For example, 
most investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan invest in these types of 
projects and considered tax incentives an important factor.89 
 
D.  EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
There appear to be two normative arguments about the efficiency of FDI 
tax incentives. First, tax incentives distort behaviour and are thus 
inefficient.90 Second, tax incentives are not inefficient as long as they 
overcome market failures and compensate foreign investors for positive 
externalities.91 The second argument is more persuasive in the Chinese 
context. FDI tax incentives aim at influencing foreign investors’ decision 
in order to attract investment to China. Since “tax incentives are meant to 
distort behaviour,”92 they are deliberate violations of neutrality. Like other 
types of tax expenditures, it is inappropriate to evaluate FDI tax incentives 
under the normative theory of neutrality or efficiency. Instead, efficiency 
is better assessed by examining the type of investors’ behaviour induced 
                                                 
88 See David Bartlett, China’s rise as a global manufacturing power,  GEC Executive 
Brief,  May 2003, available at http://globaleconomics.net/graphics/ChinaMFG.pdf. 
89 Kevin Honglin Zhang, Why Does so much FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan go to 
Mainland China? (16) China Economic Rev. 293-307 (2005). 
90 See UN, THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A 
SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/121, UN. Sales No. E.92.II.A.2. 
(1992); TAX INCENTIVES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INESTMENT: A GLOBAL 
SURVEYM U.N. Doc. CTAD/ITE/IPC/Misc. 3, U.N. Sales no. E.01.II.D.5 (2000); 
OECD, TAXATION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: THE EXPERIENCE 
OF THE ECONOMIES OF TRANSITION. Paris, OECD (1995). Economists tend to 
argue that state intervention in the form of tax subsidies distorts the efficient allocation of 
resources through price and market mechanisms. For a survey of these views, see 
Margalioth, supra note 85; and Nov (2006), supra note 57, at 842-4. 
91 Margalioth, ibid., at 182. 
92 Ibid., at 182. 
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by the incentives and the extent to which the incentives worsen, as 
opposed to, overcome market failures.   
Positive externalities of FDI.  FDI tax incentives were intended to 
attract FDI that would not have come to China otherwise. To the extent 
that the FDI attracted by tax incentives entails positive externalities,93 the 
incentives are efficient. Positive externalities of FDI in general are much 
in evidence. FDI has been considered to be the “engine” of China’s rapid 
economic growth: FIEs contributed to about 0.4 percentage points to 
China’s annual GDP growth during the 1990s,94 helped China build a 
highly competitive and dynamic manufacturing sector for exports,95 and 
affected China’s economic growth through the diffusion of idea and 
transfer of technology.96 The jobs created by FIEs in urban areas 
quadrupled between 1991 and 1999 to a total of 6 million, accounting for 
3% of China’s urban employment.97 Because FDI was an important source 
of China’s economic growth, it is a powerful force for general poverty 
reduction in China.98  
As discussed above, however, it is unclear as to the extent of FDI that was 
actually attracted by tax incentives. It is thus difficult to ascertain how 
efficient tax incentives are. Meanwhile, the choice of tax incentive 
instruments and the difficulties of administering these instruments in a 
transitional economy provide investors with opportunities to take 
advantage of, or abuse, these tax incentives.  To the extent that these FDI-
specific tax incentives encourage tax avoidance or evasion without 
generating any real increase in economic activities, they clearly have a 
negative impact on the economy. 
                                                 
93 Ibid., at 183. 
94 Tseng and Zebregs, supra note 69. 
95 Ibid. See also Zhang Tao, Utilization of Foreign Capital and Economic Growth in 
China, vol. 37, no. 1 The Chinese Economy 62-84 (January-February 2004).   
96 See Stephane Dees, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Determinants and Effects, 31 
Economics of Planning  175-94 (1998). 
97 Tseng and Zebregs, supra note 69.  
98 Kevin Zhang, supra note 89. 




“Round tripping”.   Chinese tax incentives have been granted only to 
“foreign” investors. As expected, this has resulted in a significant degree 
of “round tripping”.99 Chinese laws do not define “foreign” in any 
substantive manner. A company is “foreign” as long as its place of 
registration is outside Mainland China. Chinese investors, who would 
otherwise pay tax at least 10% higher than FIEs, have been motivated to 
engage in round tripping. The People’s Daily100  reported: 
The British Virgin Islands is a major destination for 
China's offshore investment. … 10,000 out of 500,000 
companies there are from China.  Most China-originated 
money entering tax havens will re-enter China as "foreign 
investment," – "round tripping".  … A closer examination 
of China's star foreign direct investment (FDI) figures 
reveal a large amount of capital going out of the country 
and returning under a different guise. The World Bank and 
other experts have estimated the scale of this round 
tripping could be as large as 20 % to 30 % of the total FDI 
inflow into China, but there is no clear definition and 
detailed estimation method behind the numbers. … Even 
worse is that the trend is growing bigger. … The biggest 
pay-off for recycling mainland-originated money through a 
web of companies offshore is the tax concessions that 
China grants to foreign firms.  
Round tripping clearly distorts the investment behaviour of Chinese 
investors. Since the capital is originated from China, the positive 
externalities expected of genuine FDI could not occur.101 Moreover, round 
                                                 
99 Easson argued that such round-tripping may happen whenever tax incentives are given 
only to foreign investors: Easson, supra note 61, at 367. 
100 China Daily, Investment outflows to tax havens, People’s Daily Online, June 22, 2004, 
available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200406/22/eng20040622_147138.html  
(visited July 31, 2007).  
101 The World Bank and other agencies and experts have estimated that the scale of this 
round tripping could be as high as a quarter of the total FDI inflows into PRC: World 
Bank (2002), GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 2002, available at 
www.worldbank.org. For more discussion. see Geng Xiao, Round-Tripping Foreign 
Direct Investment in the People’s Republic of China: Scale, Causes and Implications , 
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tripping makes a mockery of the Chinese tax system by circumventing the 
law in a “glorified” manner. Round tripping also distorts data on FDI in 
China, which may not only influence the effectiveness and official 
management of China's FDI utilization, but also bring risks to China’s 
financial system.102 
 
Perennial losses or “footloose” investors. The tax holiday for “new” 
FIEs starts in the first year of making a profit. Chinese researchers found 
that many FIEs postpone reporting a profit in China by “surplus stripping” 
techniques (such as paying royalties, management fees and excessive 
interest to foreign related companies) or transfer pricing.103  In this way, 
the FIE can use the tax holiday when the profit and income tax are 
significant. Otherwise, the tax holiday would begin in the first-year of 
profit, irrespective of the amount of tax saved.   
 
Tax holidays begin as soon as a FIE taxpayer becomes profitable and 
expire at the end of the specified period. They primarily benefit short-term 
investments, which often are undertaken by “footloose” companies that 
quickly disappear from one location to reappear in another. The tax 
holidays also tend to reward the establishment of a FIE, rather than 
investment in an existing enterprise.  Chinese researchers found that many 
FIEs terminate an investment in order to start a “new” investment as soon 
as the tax holiday is over.104 About one quarter of all FIEs registered since 
1979 were believed to have paid no income tax because, among others, the 
investment was terminated after the tax holiday.105 This, in part, explains 
                                                                                                                         
available at http://www.adbi.org/discussion-
paper/2004/06/01/450.prc.foreign.direct.investment (2004)(visited July 31, 2007). 
102 China Daily, supra note 100. 
103 See, for example, Chunshan Wu, The Use of Tax Havens and Their Prevention,  
No.10, International Taxation in China, 25-26 (in Chinese) (1998); and Jun Ye, An 
Examination of the Reasons for Keeping or Abolishing FDI Tax Incentives, No.11, 
International Taxation in China 28-29 (in Chinese) (2005). 
104 Wu, ibid.; and Wei Tie, An Evaluation of the Causes for Tax Avoidance under Current 
Law, no.11 International Taxation in China 32-34 (in Chinese) (1999). 
105 Sun, supra note 56.  This is consistent with international evidence on the use of tax 
holidays; see Morisset and Pirnia, supra note 58, at12-13. 




the somewhat puzzling phenomenon that foreign companies keep 
investing in China “irrespective of short-term profitability”.106 The 
transaction costs associated with open and close of FIEs have no economic 
benefits other than saving taxes.  
Administrative inefficiencies.  There are efficiency costs associated 
with the administration of FDI tax incentives. It is widely recognized in 
China that FDI tax incentives are misused and abused at local levels.107 
Tax incentive legislation provides a great deal of discretion to local tax 
authorities to approve tax incentives.108 The lack of transparency and 
accountability in administering tax incentive legislation tend to lead to 
graft, corruption and rent seeking.109 Local governments have also 
engaged in fierce tax competition by not only lobbying the Central 
Government for more tax preferences.110   
Market Failures and tax discrimination. China introduced FDI tax 
incentives to, in part, compensate investors for the lack of market or 
investment conditions. During the early years of reform, these incentives 
played a positive role in attracting investment, which, in turn, promoted 
                                                 
106 Littlewood, supra note 64, at 476. 
107 See, for example, Tingxu Li, Means of Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion by Foreign 
Investment Enterprises and Prevention Measures, No.8 International Tax J. of China 62-
64 (in Chinese) (1999); Wei Tie, Causes and Assessment of Tax Avoidance under 
Current Tax System, No.11 Int’l Taxation in China 32-34 (in Chinese) (2005); and Jun 
Ye, To Repeal or Not to Repeal of Foreign Tax Incentive Policies,  No.11 International 
Tax J.  of China 28-29 (in Chinese) (2005). 
108 For example, article 8 of the 1991 FIE and Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law states: 
“Any enterprise with foreign investment which is engaged in agriculture, forestry or 
animal husbandry and any other enterprise with foreign investment which is established 
in remote underdeveloped areas may, upon approval by the competent department for tax 
affairs under the State Council of an application filed by the enterprise, be allowed a 15% 
to 30% reduction of the amount of income tax payable for a period of 10 years …” 
109 See S. Wei, Does Corruption Relieve Foreign Investors of the Burden of Taxes and 
Capital Controls? The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 2209 (1999); Zdenek 
Drabek and Warren Payne, The Impact of Transparency on Foreign Direct Investment, 
The World Trade Organization, Staff Working Paper ERAD-99-02, 2001.   
110 Li and Chen, supra note 65; and Jiang Liang, China’s current Tax Preferences of 
High-Tech and the Problems, No.10 Tax Research J. 35-38 (in Chinese) (2001).  
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the development of a market mechanism in China and propelled economic 
growth. In this sense, the tax incentives were efficient, but only as long as 
the FDI was separate from domestic enterprises. The dual track system 
was the product of China’s evolutionary approach to economic reforms.  
The domestic track was evolutionary, allowing gradual reform of state-
owned enterprises and the creation of a market mechanism. 111 During the 
early periods of economic reforms, there were significant market failures 
and the internal tax policy had strong traits of the command economy. 
FIEs were regulated more by market principles than government plans.  
Direct competition with local enterprises on the Chinese market was 
limited.   
 
The dual track system was difficult to maintain when FIEs were allowed 
greater access to the Chinese internal market, especially after China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001. Foreign firms have been gradually allowed 
to own up to 50% of enterprises in sensitive industries, such as telecom, 
banking and insurance industries. Multinational companies have taken 
over Chinese companies in a quest for economies of scale.  The FDI tax 
incentives have aided such foreign take-overs. In 2006, foreign investors 
controlled the majority of assets in 21 out of 28 major industrial sectors.112  
Given the large amount of FDI in China, domestically-funded companies 
are facing tax discrimination in addition to the challenges resulting from 
multinational firm’s control and market power on the Chinese market. The 
potential dominance of key economic sectors by multinational firms, 
                                                 
111 This policy seemed to have contributed positively to the success of economic reforms 
at earlier stages. The domestic track was considered highly successful in complementing 
the structural reforms of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A main goal in internal 
economic reforms was to restructure SOEs to become economically efficient entities. 
Replacing the previous profit-delivery mechanisms under the command economy with 
tax payments helped SOEs and their government regulators to recognize the new 
relationship between the enterprises and the government. It also provided economic 
incentives for SOEs to be more profitable as they can keep the after-tax profits. The tax 
system brought some “objective” assessment of the performances of SOEs. Another goal 
in internal economic reforms was to gradually allow the development of the private 
sector, which was previously viewed suspiciously in ideological terms. By taxing the 
profits of private enterprises the government legitimized the private sector.   
112 Weigan Shi, A Reexamination of the Role of Foreign Investors (September 1, 2006), 
available at http://finance.sina.com.cn (in Chinese). 




assisted by the tax system, became a serious concern.113 Chinese-owned 
enterprises started to cry for “national treatment” from their own 
government. The Minister of Finance, Jin, Renqing, acknowledged this in 
his explanation of the draft law to the National People’s Congress:114 
 
Great changes have taken place in China's economy and 
society, and the socialist market economy has initially 
taken shape. With China's accession to the WTO, the 
Chinese domestic market has been further open to foreign 
capital; domestic enterprises have gradually integrated 
themselves into the world economy and are facing ever-
increasing competition. If different tax policies continued 
to be implemented for domestic and foreign-funded 
enterprises, the former would definitely be put at a 
competitive disadvantage and the establishment of a 
unified market with standardized and fair competition 
would be obstructed.  
Therefore, FDI tax incentives that had the effect of overcoming market 
failures in the late 1970s and 1980s became barriers to market-based 
competition in the late 1990s and 2000s.  With the gradual improvement in 
market conditions, the incentive measures became less efficient. 
 
E. EQUITY IN CHINA 
Compared to the efficiency aspect of FDI tax incentives, the equity and 
redistribution effect of FDI tax incentives has received much less attention 
in tax literature.115 In theory, the  redistributive effect of FDI tax 
                                                 
113 See Hung-Gay Fung, Julius H Johnson, Jr., and Yanda Xu, Winners and Losers: 
Foreign Firms in China’s Emerging Market, vol.37, No.3 The Chinese Economy, 5-16 
(2004). 
114 Renqing Jin, Explanation on Draft Enterprise Income Tax Law. The full text of the 
speech in English is available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t302221.htm 
(visited July 31, 2007). 
115 For a discussion of the equity aspect of tax competition, see Reuven Avi-Yonah, 
Bridging the North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax Competition, 26 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 371 (2004); and Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another 
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incentives exists if they result in shifting part of the tax burden from 
mobile to relatively immobile factors and from income to consumption.116   
In China’s case, such redistributive effect is barely noticeable. China’s tax 
structure has always relied on consumption taxes as a main source of 
revenue: the Value-added Tax (VAT) and other sales taxes generate more 
than two-thirds of total tax revenue; income taxes collected from 
enterprises and individuals generate about 22% of total tax revenue.117 The 
tax policy towards FDI has not affected the overall design of the Chinese 
tax structure. The tax structure in China cannot, by design, play a key role 
in alleviating inequality in income and wealth.  In developed countries, 
personal income tax has been used as the main instrument for 
redistributing income.118 In China, the role of progressive personal income 
tax in redistribution remains largely symbolic at the moment; the 
Individual Income Tax119 is the only progressive tax in China, accounting 
                                                                                                                         
Perspective on International Tax Competition,  89 Geo. L. J. 543 (2001). For a critique of 
the role of  Miranda Stewart and S. Jogarajan, S, The International Monetary Fund and 
Tax Reform, British Tax Review   146-175 (2004); and Miranda Stewart, Global 
Trajectories of Tax Reform: Mapping Tax Reform in Developing and Transition 
Countries, 44 Harvard International Law J. 140-190   (2003).  
116 These two aspects are listed as evidence of harmful effects of “preferential tax 
regimes” in the OECD HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION REPORT. Paris, OECD 
(1998), para.23. 
117 CHINA STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2005. Beijing, China: Finance Press. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/html/H0803e.htm. The VAT and turnover taxes 
have some progressive features. For example, the Consumption Tax is imposed on luxury 
goods and services at progressive rates. This tax is presumably borne by high-income 
earners. The VAT is slightly progressive with a lower rate on certain necessities (e.g., 
grain and edible oil, running water). Overall however, these taxes worsen the urban/rural 
disparities as low-income rural residents much pay these taxes. In many poor rural areas, 
these taxes are the only taxes collected. See Tao Ran and Mingxing Liu, Urban and Rural 
Household Taxation in China: Measurement, Comparison and Policy Implications,(10) 
No.4 J. of the Asia Pacific Economy 486-505 (2005). 
118 See Richard M. Bird and Eric M. Zolt, The Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax 
in Developing Countries, (52) UCLA L. Rev. 1627, at 1627 (2005). 
119 The Individual Income Tax Law has been amended on October 31, 1993, August 30, 
1999, and October 27, 2005.  




for less than 6 % of total tax revenue.120 Chinese tax policy has not played 
any significant role in promoting social development or redistribution of 
income.121 China’s goal is to develop a “Xiaokang society” in which 
“people generally are not rich but have adequate food, clothing, and other 
material belongings necessary for a decent life.”122 Economic development 
is a precondition for reaching this goal.123 The efficiency and economic 
                                                 
120 This is not much different from the role of personal income tax in other developing 
countries. See Bird and Eric Zolt, supra note 118. Although still an insignificant source of 
revenue for the government, the amount of revenue increased rapidly: it grew by more 
than 6 times between 1980 (CNY0.1 million, accounting for less than 1% of total tax 
revenue) and 2004 (CNY173,700 million): see State Administration of Taxation, Tax 
Statistics, published on its website: www.chinatax.gov.cn (visited on April 20, 2006). It is 
progressive only with respect to employment income and business income as other types 
of income are taxable at a flat rate. The fraction of population paying the tax grew from 
0.1% of all wage earners in 1986 to 32% of all wage earners in 2001120 and the average 
amount of annual tax paid by each wage earner was CNY314 (less than USD40) in 2002. 
More than one-third of the total IIT on employment income was collected from workers 
at FIEs. Given the current situations in China, the Individual Income Tax cannot be a 
meaningful tool of redistribution. For further discussion, see Thomas Piketty and Nancy 
Qian, Income Inequality and Progressive Income Taxation in China and India, 1986-
2001, available at 
http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Nancy_Qian/Papers/PikettyQian2004.pdf (2004); Jinyan 
Li, Chinese Individual Income Tax: A 26-Year Old Infant. Tax Notes Int’l (July 24, 
2006) 297; Hua Shi, Changes in the IIT Revenue Composition, No.4 China Taxation 4-6 
(in Chinese) (2004); FRONTIER TAX POLICY STUDY IN CHINA. Beijing, China: 
China Taxation Press, 2003, at 344. 
121 China has achieved social development in certain areas. For example, according to the 
United Nations report, China’s human development index improved continuously in the 
past 20 years, from 0.557 in 1980 to 0.755 in 2003 and China’s global ranking rose from 
101st in 1991 to 85th in 2003.121 On the other hand, there have been increasing income 
disparities, regional disparities, and urban and rural disparities. For example, in 2002, per 
capita GDP in East China was CNY12,266, but only CNY5,144 in Southwest. Within the 
Southwest region, urban per capita GDP was CNY6,304, and rural per capita GDP was 
only CNY1,744. Women, children, and racial minorities are generally disadvantaged 
disproportionately.   
122 UNDP, CHINA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, available at 
http://www.undp.org.cn at 1. 
123 This is not much different from the “Asian path” to development: Pareerboom (2005), 
supra note 9. In 2005, however, the new leadership put forward the concept of scientific 
development and the concept of harmonious society to guide reforms. This was the first 
time that China took a more comprehensive approach towards development. Social 
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growth objectives of tax policy have been largely divorced from the equity 
and redistribution objectives of tax policy.  The FDI tax incentives cannot 
be blamed for failing to promote redistributive justice in China as they 
were not intended as such.       
 
IV. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
China’s experiment with FDI-specific tax incentives presents some 
interesting issues for international tax debates. It is true that China is 
different from many other developing countries because of its sheer size: 
the world’s largest recipient of FDI, fourth largest economy, and third 
largest trader.124  As a market-maker, China is perhaps more capable of 
escaping the “prisoner’s dilemma”125 that smaller, open developing 
                                                                                                                         
development is elevated to complement economic development. The concept of 
harmonious society stresses the need to reconcile conflicts between rural and urban areas 
and between different social groups to promote social stability. It is linked to the notions 
of social welfare and more equal income distribution and to the rule of law. This new 
comprehensive approach has not been reflected in tax policy. This part of the paper 
examines the relationship between tax policy and social development. See National 
People’s Congress, REPORT ON THE WORK OF GOVERNMENT Third Session, 10th 
National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 
March 5, 2005. 
124 For a detailed discussion of FDI flows, see World Investment Report, 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1485&lang=1   
125 The prisoner’s dilemma is a game theory. It is a type of non-zero-sum game in which 
two players may each "cooperate" with or "defect" (i.e. betray) the other player. In the 
classic form of this game, no matter what the other player does, one player will always 
gain a greater payoff by playing defect. Since in any situation playing defect is more 
beneficial than cooperating, all rational players will play defect. In the context of tax 
competition, this theory holds that even if all countries participating in the competition 
knows that they are collectively better off by cooperating with one another by refraining 
from granting tax incentives, no country wanted to do that for fear that other countries 
won’t follow. So, every country chose to “defect”.  According to Shaviro, the number 
of articles in U.S. and Canadian law reviews mentioning prisoner’s dilemmas was 837 
over a five-year period ended in June 2006. See Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare 
as a Normative Standard in U.S. Tax Policy? http://wwwrn.comabstract=966256 (2007). 




countries tend to fall victim to. Meanwhile, China has paid close attention 
to international tax norm and followed the advice of international experts 
when they are suitable to China’s conditions.126  The increasing integration 
of the Chinese economy with the world economy has made it increasingly 
important for China to care about tax policy of other countries and for 
other countries to care about China’s. The implications of the Chinese 
experience are discussed below in terms of the choice of tax policy 
instruments in attracting FDI, harmful effects on other countries, and inter-
nation equity and redistribution. 
 
B. CHOICE OF TAX INSTRUMENT FOR ATTRACTING FDI  
Tax policy matters. China’s experience challenges “a widely held view 
that tax incentives of all sorts have proved to be largely ineffective, while 
causing serious distortions and inequities in corporate taxation."127  During 
the earlier years of Chinese reforms, FDI tax incentives were generally 
considered effective as they helped China overcome some investment 
hurdles (market failures and lack of ideal institutional investment 
environment), send a signal of welcoming foreign investment, and entice 
overseas Chinese to invest in China. As a temporary measure, FDI tax 
incentives played a role in jumping-start China’s economic 
development.128 The overall effect, however, has been mixed. When 
                                                 
126 In the late 1970s, when advised by international experts that granting tax incentives 
was not a good idea126 China ignored it. During early 2000s, when China’s internal 
conditions require it, similar international advice became heeded to and FDI tax 
incentives were replaced with a general lower corporate tax rate.   
127 Janet Stotsky, Summary of IMPF Tax Policy Advice, in TAX POLICY HANDBOOK 
279, 282 (Parthasarathi Shome ed., 1995). 
128 In this sense, China’s experience is generally consistent with that of Singapore. See 
Johan Deprez, The Telecommunications Industry in the Information Age: A Case Study 
in Globalization, Deregulation, and Tax Competition, 23 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 
537  (2001); N. Jerold Cohen, ABA Members Comment on Runaway Plant Proposal 96 
TNT 150-31 (May 31, 1996); Terrence R. Chorvat, Book Review: A Different 
Perspective on Tax Competition 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 501; How Teck Tan, 
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domestic market conditions and institutional settings improved, the FDI 
tax policy became less effective and less efficient.  
The Chinese experience also shows the importance of tax competition. In 
the age of globalization, the cross-border mobility of capital limits a 
country’s freedom in taxing capital. Even though tax-policy making 
remains a hallmark of national sovereignty, few countries can afford to 
ignore the international competitiveness of their tax policy.129 China is no 
exception. To be competitive, China used FDI-specific incentives in the 
past and will use a generally lower corporate tax rate in the future.130 A 
general low tax rate is, in itself, an incentive.131   
From FDI specific incentives to general low rate.  The promulgation of 
the EIT Law that adopts an universal tax rate for all enterprises, 
irrespective of they receive FDI, represents a major shift in Chinese tax 
policy from a temporary, transitional mode to a mature, outward-looking 
mode. It moves the Chinese tax system closer to international tax norm.132 
Tax neutrality is one of the important principles underlying the reform.133 
                                                 
129 H. David Rosenbloom, Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in 
the Tax Area, vol.20, Canada-United States L. J. 267-272, at 267  (1994). No area of the 
law is closer to the subject of sovereignty than taxation. As long as diversity of culture, 
economy, political and fiscal factors leads countries to pursue a wide range of income tax 
systems, countries will try their best to preserve their tax sovereignty. For a further 
discussion on the implications of globalization for tax policy, see John P. Steines, Jr., 
Income Tax Implications of Free Trade, vol. 49 Tax L. Rev. 675-89 (1994). 
130 See Margalioth, supra note 57; Ireland is often cited as a success story with its 
generally low corporate tax rate.  The OECD also makes a distinction between tax 
competition in the form of generally applicable lower tax rates and tax regimes designed 
to attract FDI: OECD 1998 and OECD 2000, infra note 178. 
131 Moriset and Pirnia, supra note 58, at 12. 
132 Jin, supra note 114. In explaining the draft law to the National People’s Congress, the 
Minister of Finance identified the following as guiding principles for the new law: equal 
taxation of all enterprises at the rate of 25%; the promotion of overall, sustainable 
development of the Chinese economy, reference to international tax norm and practices; 
and efficiency tax administration and simplicity in compliance.  
133 The principle of capital export neutrality is reflected by retaining the system of 
worldwide taxation and foreign tax credit mechanism, as well as introducing new anti-
deferral rules under Article 45 that are targeted at low-tax jurisdictions. For the first time, 
China introduced a general anti-avoidance rule in Article 47 to supplement the specific 




Several domestic and international factors seem to have influenced 
China’s decision to abolish FDI tax incentives and to adopt a generally 
lower corporate income tax rate.  
Domestically, the Chinese government decided in 2005 to upgrade 
China’s economic development model from that of FDI-led manufacturing 
and export to one of a technology-driven, sustainable economic 
development.134 The existing tax incentives were geared to promote the 
former model of development and were thus outdated. By 2007, the 
Central Government’s fiscal position had been relatively strong to afford 
the general reduction of corporate tax rate.  The increasing integration of 
FDI with the domestic economy made it very difficult for the government 
to justify preferential tax policy towards FDI.  There were also serious 
doubts about the effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting “real” foreign 
investment to China that help China develop a sustainable economy.  
Internationally, China’s accession to the WTO had tremendous impact. 
Because China must allow foreign investors to have access to the Chinese 
market, domestic enterprises were exposed to international competition 
and were at risk of losing out to multinational corporations. The FDI tax 
incentives further aid foreign companies in competing with Chinese 
companies. Such “supra national treatment” was certainly not required by 
the WTO. Chinese businesses seized the opportunity to lobby the 
government to end tax discrimination. Another source of international 
influence is Ireland’s economic success.135  Adopting the Irish model will 
“kill two birds with one stone” by ending tax discrimination against 
domestic companies and maintaining China’s tax competitiveness. Finally, 
the harmful tax competition movement and characterization of China as a 
                                                                                                                         
international anti-avoidance rules, such as transfer pricing (Art.41) and thin-capitalization 
rules (Article 46).    
134 For an overview of this policy shift, see John Whalley and Weimin Zhou,  Technology 
Upgrading and China's Growth Strategy to 2020, Centre for International Governance 
and Innovation (CIGI) (March 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982232. 
135  Mongolia, supra note 57, suggests in his paper that developing countries may gain a 
comparative advantage over developed countries if they drop their corporate tax rates 
(even to zero) and rely on other forms of taxation (as they anyway do). 
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“production haven” may have persuaded some policy makers to remove 
these havens.   
 
The most important factor of all is China’s confidence in attracting FDI 
without FDI specific incentives.  The Finance Minister explained:  
 
International experience has shown that political stability, 
sound economic development, big market, rich human 
resources, constantly improving legal environment and 
government services are main factors for absorbing foreign 
investment, and the tax preference is only one factor. 
Therefore, the new Tax Law will not exert a great impact 
on foreign investment. 
 
It is clear that China has not abandoned its policy of attracting FDI.  In 
lieu of FDI-specific tax incentives, China hopes to better attract FDI by 
offering lower tax rates than other countries.136 The Minister of Finance 
stated:137 
 
[T]he level of enterprise income tax rates in the world, 
especially the neighboring countries (regions), has to be 
taken into account. The average enterprise income tax rate 
is 28.6 percent in 159 countries (regions) around the world 
in which an enterprise income tax is applied, while that in 
China's 18 neighboring countries (regions) is 26.7 percent. 
                                                 
136 The SAT relied on research data indicating the prevailing corporate tax rate in 20 
industrial countries (including EU members, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and 
the United States) and 22 non-industrial countries (including Brazil, Chile, Hungary, 
India, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Thailand, Turkey, Peru, 
Argentina, Mongolia, Vietnam and Iran).  The research report is published at the SAT 
website: www.chinatax.gov.cn (in Chinese). Empirical research indicates that general 
corporate tax rate is a better instrument than selective tax incentives as a means to 
encourage FDI inflow: Thiess Buettner and Martin Ruf, Tax Incentives and the Location 
of FDI: Evidence from a Panel of German Multinationals, Deutsche Bundesbank 
Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies, No.17/2005, available at 
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0476.pdf; and W. Steven Clark, Tax Incentives for 
Foreign Direct Investment: Empirical Evidence on Effects and Alternative Policy 
Options, Vol.48, No.4 Can. Tax J. 1139 (2000). 
137 Jin, supra note 114.  




The rate of 25 percent set in the Draft is relatively low in 
the world and will be conducive to enhancing enterprise 
competitiveness and attracting foreign investment.   
Preliminary impact on FDI.  The new tax law has been perceived thus far 
to reflect “a growing confidence in China’s global standing, not only for 
lower cost manufacturing, but as a consumer market with its own 
draw.”138 This, in itself, has a positive impact on investors’ confidence in 
China.  The new tax law certainly provides more certainty and 
predictability for investors by removing many aspects of administrative 
discretions in approving tax incentives, fixing the tax rate, and less state 
interference in investment and business decisions.  It is expected that the 
original tax incentive policy started the engine of China’s economic 
development and that the new tax policy will support and sustain the 
development. 
The new EIT Law also continues with the basic framework of the existing 
FIE Tax Law, which incorporated many concepts and principles of 
corporate taxation used in OECD countries. The tax incentives are 
designed to promote long-term, sustainable investment and 
development.139  Tax preferences continue for favoured activities.  Instead 
of tax holidays, the new law provides incentives in the form of accelerated 
deductions for research and development expenses and certain capital 
expenditures. Instead of FDI specific tax rate reductions, the new law 
provides for a lower rate of 20 per cent for all “small” enterprises and 15 
percent for all “high-tech” enterprises.140  It is expected that more than half 
                                                 
138 Tom Leander, The big changes in China’s tax code reflect a shift in economic 
priorities. But much about the law remains a mystery, CFO Asia (May 2007), available at 
http://www.cfoasia.com/archives/200705-10.htm. The 2007 tax reform has been 
perceived to represent China’s commitment to the WTO, which can only strengthen 
China’s attraction to foreign investment. The tax increase for FIEs “will not crush out the 
zest of foreign investment” because “what weighs in their decision is China's huge 
market potential.”  Thus far, negative reaction to the new law is mostly associated with 
the lack of detailed rules and regulations to implement the law.  
139 Tax-preferred investments include those in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, 
and fishery, public infrastructure, environmental protection, energy and water resources 
conservation, research and development, and transfers of technology. 
140 EIT Law, supra note 41, art.4. 
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of existing FIEs qualify for as either small enterprises or high-tech 
enterprises. 
Investors and capital markets in China appear to welcome the new tax law 
as they expect the big domestic companies – the major banks, telecom 
companies, oil and gas producers – that dominate indexes of Chinese 
stocks, will see their after-tax earnings boosted by the tax change.141 
Foreign investors looking for a more transparent and neutral tax policy as 
part of investment environment welcome the changes. For example, US 
technology firm Motorola declared that it had no plans to alter its 
investment strategy in China. US-based GE said it will respond to the 
incentives for clean technologies by investing US$50m to build a 
Shanghai technology center for environmentally friendly products.142 
Similarly, established FIEs that have used up their tax holidays or are 
engaged in the activities that are tax-favoured under the new law (such as 
research and development, infrastructure, environmental industries, etc.) 
stand to benefit under the new law.143   
Foreign manufacturers that are making products for sale in China are 
attracted to China by the internal market, not the tax incentives. As such, 
ending the FDI-specific tax incentives had minimal impact on these 
investors. Foreign investors contemplating activities in services in non-
productive activities (such as services) would be similarly unaffected by 
the new tax policy as such activities were not eligible for tax incentives 
under the previous regime.144 “Footloose” investors may move out of 
                                                 
141 Andrew Baston, China's Expected New Tax Law would Even the Playing Field,  The 
Wall Street J.  February 26, 2007, Page C9. 
142 Leander, supra note 138. 
143 Leander, ibid, reports that some multinationals have adapted their business plans to the 
policy change. GE (General Electric) China has announced it will invest 50 million U.S. 
dollars in its Shanghai-based technology center for products serving environmental 
protection, including more efficient airplane engines and wind power generators, 
seawater desalination technology, and energy-saving bulbs.  
144 See Olivia Chung, Mixed feelings over China’s new tax system, China Business, 
March 21, 1997, available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/IC21Cb01.html. 




China to jurisdictions offering lower corporate tax rates, such as Vietnam, 
but the sign of such flight is not yet emerging.  
 
C. HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION 
  
According to the OECD report on Harmful Tax Competition Report: An 
Emerging Global Issue145 countries engage in harmful tax competition by 
offering “preferential tax regimes” or being tax havens. Tax havens are 
harmful to other countries by eroding their tax base, thereby reducing 
those countries’ revenue for financing social welfare.146  Preferential tax 
regimes also erode other countries’ tax base.147 In addition, by distorting 
locational decisions, FDI may be located in a country where the pre-tax 
return is lower, thereby reducing the global efficiency in allocation of 
resources. The OECD’s position has been well debated in literature148 and 
the views are mixed.149   
                                                 
145 OECD, supra note 116;  and OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: 
REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS: PROGRESS 
IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES. Paris, OECD 
2000.  
146 Ibid.  
147 Ibid., para.4. 
148 See, for example, Reuven Avi-Yohan, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal 
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harvard L. Rev. 1573 (2000); -- Bridging the 
North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax Competition, 26 Mich. J. Int’l 
L. 371  (2004); William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation and Tax Competition: 
overcoming the Contradictions,  22 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 161 (2002); Karen B. Brown, 
Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD View,  32 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l L. & Econ. 311 
(1999); Rajiv Biswas, ed. INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION: 
GLOBALISATION AND FISCAL SOVEREIGNTY. London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2002; Lorraine Eden and Robert T. Kudrle, Tax Havens: Renegade States in 
the International Tax Regime? Vol.27 Law & Policy 109 (2005); Richard A. Johnson, 
Why Harmful Tax Practices Will Continue After Developing Nations Pay: A Critique of 
the OECD’s Initiatives Against Harmful Tax Competition, 26 B.C. Third World L. J. 351  
(2006) (reviewing William Brittain-Catlin, OFFSHORE: THE DARK SIDE OF THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY. New York: Farra, Straus, and Giroux. 2005; Keith Engel, Tax 
Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck in the Middle 
 
 
38                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 01 
 
 
China is clearly not a classic tax haven.150 Chinese FDI tax incentives are 
technically not “preferential tax regimes” because they are designed “to 
attract investment in plant, building and equipment” not “geographically 
mobile activities”.151 And yet, these incentives were intended to attract 
investment away from other countries to China’s “production havens”.152  
Classic tax havens have been leading sources of FDI inflow to China. 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Samoan and Mauritius are among 
the top ten sources.153 In 2005, for example, FDI from British Virgin 
Islands (USD5.96 billion) was more than five times of that from the 
United States (USD1.03 billion).154  Therefore, China offers an interesting 
case study on the issue of harmful tax competition as well as the 
interaction between the tax laws of the home country and the host country.  
Two specific questions are examined below: (a) Are the Chinese tax 
incentives responsible for changing the investor’s decision to invest in 
China rather than at home; (b) Are these incentives responsible for 
increasing the use of tax havens to avoid residence country’s tax?  
 
                                                                                                                         
with Subpart F, 79 Texas L. Rev. 1525 (2001); Littlewood, supra note 64;  Roin, supra 
note 115.  
149 For example, Littlewood states that “The OECD seems on solid ground, therefore, in 
its assertion that tax havens generally detract from global welfare. There are, therefore, 
good reasons for eradicating tax havens” (supra note 64, at 439). However, he finds the 
OECD position on preferential tax regimes problematic. Roin (supra note 115) argues 
against the OECD position in general. The essays included in the book edited by Biswas, 
ibid., generally support tax competition and take a negative view of trying to curb it. See 
Terrence R. Chorvat, A Different Perspective on Tax Competition, 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. 
Rev. 501  (2002).  
150 China was referred to as a “production haven” because of the tax incentives were 
granted mostly to FDI engaged in productive activities. Avi-Yonah (2004), supra note 
115. 
151 OECD 1998 Report, supra note 116, para.6. 
152 See Avi-Yonah (2004), supra note 115. 
153 For a list of origins of FDI, see CHINA STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (2005), 
available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/html/R1815e.htm (visited July 31, 
2007).  
154  Ibid. 




Base erosion in the home country. Some recent studies show that source 
country tax incentives do not affect the decision of a multinational as to 
whether to invest domestically or overseas in the form of FDI.155 Once a 
multinational has decided to invest in a developing country, it is 
questionable whether the host country tax incentives actually affect the 
location of the  investment. One view is that “once other factors have 
provoked the decisions to set up production facilities in a broad area, then 
the more precise location decision may be strongly affected by such 
[incentive] factors”.156  Another view is that developing countries are in a 
‘no-win’ situation with respect to attracting FDI by using tax incentives as 
they seem likely to lose revenue without attracting additional FDI.157 
 
There is no conclusive evidence that Chinese FDI tax incentives enticed 
investment away from the investor’s home country, although it is possible 
that these incentives attracted FDI away from other developing countries, 
especially those in the same region. In terms of low-cost manufacturing 
and processing, investments in extractive industries, and other productive 
activities that are cost sensitive, it is difficult to imagine that any OECD 
member country could compete with China for similar investment 
projects. Even if Chinese tax incentives were effective in influencing the 
location of FDI in China, they could not be said to have contributed to 
“poaching” the tax base of the investor’s home country.   
 
Home country’s tax policy. In order to examine the potential harmful 
effect of Chinese tax incentives to the investor’s residence country, it is 
necessary to examine that country’s system of taxing foreign source 
income, especially foreign business income. At the moment, the residence 
country is typically a member of the OECD158 that has either an 
                                                 
155 See Devereaux and Freeman, supra note 57.    
156 Moriset and Pirnia, supra note 58, reviewing a study by Forsyth in 1972: D. Forsyth, 
US INVESTMENT IN SCOTLAND. New York: Praeger, 1972. 
157 Goodspeed, supra note 81, at 13.  
158 The overwhelming majority of multinational enterprises are resident in OECD 
countries. See Avi-Yonah (2004), supra note 115, at 1665. In 2004, only five of the top 
100 multinational companies are from developing countries (China, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Korea, and Singapore), while 85 were from the EU, Japan and the United 
States; see United Nations, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2006, New York and 
Geneva 2006, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf (visited July 31, 2007). 
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“exemption” system, a “credit” system or a hybrid. Under the exemption 
system, foreign income earned by a resident is exempted from taxation in 
the residence country. Such exemption system is often justified on ground 
of capital import neutrality (CIN) in that the worldwide tax burden on the 
income is determined by the source country. Under a credit system, 
foreign income is taxable in the residence country, but a credit is granted 
for foreign taxes paid dollar for dollar up to the amount of domestic tax 
payable. The credit system is often justified on ground of capital export 
neutrality (CEN) in that foreign income is taxed in the same way as 
domestic income.159  
 
Generally speaking, Chinese FDI tax incentives cannot erode an exempt 
country’s tax base because Chinese income is not included in the tax base 
in the first place.  In the case of a credit country, Chinese tax incentives 
have the effect of “giving” China’s tax base to the residence country.  
Even if a tax sparing credit is granted by the residence country, its tax base 
cannot be said to have been eroded by Chinese tax incentives, because the 
tax base is the same as if Chinese taxes were paid. With respect to foreign 
portfolio income, however, OECD countries generally apply the CEN 
principle and do not permit the deferral of residence country tax on such 
income.160  
                                                 
159 It is beyond the scope of this article to overview the literature on international tax 
neutralities and the classification of tax systems of OECD countries. For further 
reference, see Hugh J. Ault and Brian J. Arnold, COMPARATIVE INCOME 
TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS (2nd edition). Kluwer Law International, 
2004; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for 
Simplification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301 (1996); Michael Graetz, Taxing International 
Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax 
L. Rev. 261 (2001); Michael Graetz and Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio 
Income, 56 Tax L. Rev. 537 (2003); Shaviro, supra note 125.  
160 For an overview of these rules, see Brian Arnold, THE TAXATION OF 
CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISON. Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1986; Daniel Sandler, TAX 
TREATIES AND CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION: PUSHING 
THE BOUNDARIES (2nd ed.), Deventer, The Netherlands: 1998; IFA, Limits on the Use 
of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging 
Trends, 86b Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2001); and OECD, CONTROLLED 
FOREIGN COMPANY LEGISLATION. Paris, OECD, 1996; United States Department 
of the Treasury, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH U.S. 
CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY (December 2000). 





Because Chinese tax incentives apply mostly to FDI and portfolio 
investment in China remains limited,161 the focus of the debate is the 
possible erosion of the tax base related to foreign business income. We 
will use Canada and the United States as examples in demonstrating 
whether Chinese tax incentives actually erode the tax base of these 
countries.   
 
Canada Canada is generally a credit country,162 but implements an 
exemption system with respect to foreign active business income. In 
determining the amount of foreign tax credit, Canada has traditionally 
allowed a tax sparing credit (including one under the Canada-China Tax 
Treaty).  Foreign portfolio income is currently taxable whether or not it is 
earned through a foreign corporation, whereas foreign business income 
earned through a foreign affiliate is not currently taxable.  Foreign active 
business income earned through a foreign affiliate resident in a treaty 
country163 is included in an “exempt surplus” account of the foreign 
affiliate. Dividends paid of the exempt surplus account are “exempt 
dividends”, fully excluded from the Canadian parent’s income.164 In 
                                                 
161 Earning portfolio income in China through a Chinese resident corporation is not yet 
common. Chinese regulations generally require FIEs to be engaged in production and 
business activities. Investment holding companies are allowed only to hold investments 
in the same corporate group. In 2005, while FDI inflow was valued over USD603 billion, 
Chinese companies issued USD1.6 billion worth of shares overseas and entered into 
USD1.08 billion of international leasing transactions.161 Technology transfers are 
generally associated with FDI; FIEs imported more than half of the foreign technology 
imported by China. See Ministry of Commerce, 
http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/200707/20070704841184.html, visited on 
July 12, 2007.  
162 The Canadian FAPI regime technically adopts a ‘gross-up” and deduction system that 
mimics a foreign credit system. For further discussion, see Li, Cockfield and Wilkie, 
CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, 
Toronto: Lexis-Nexus, 2006. 
163 If the foreign business income is earned by a foreign affiliate in a non-treaty country, 
it goes to a “taxable surplus” account and the dividends paid of such account are taxable. 
An “indirect foreign tax credit” is available to recognize the foreign corporate income tax 
paid in respect of the taxable dividends received by a Canadian corporate shareholder. 
S.113(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
164 Section 113(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act.  
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effect, foreign active business income is subject to tax only in the foreign 
country. Canadian tax is payable only when the Canadian company 
distributes dividends to individual shareholders in Canada or to non-
resident shareholders.165   
Assuming that a Canadian resident company, Canco, carries on business in 
China through a branch or permanent establishment and the Chinese 
income is free from Chinese tax under the tax incentive legislation. For 
Canadian tax purposes, Canco must include its Chinese income in 
reporting its worldwide income and claim a credit for Chinese tax. Under 
the standard foreign tax credit rules, since no Chinese tax was paid, there 
is no credit available. However, by virtue of the tax sparing credit, Canco 
can obtain a credit for the Chinese tax that would have been paid in the 
absence of the tax incentives. To the extent that the Canadian tax rate 
exceeds the nominal Chinese rate, Canco still has Canadian tax payable.  
In other cases, there is no Canadian tax payable, so that the Chinese 
income is free from tax in both China and Canada. In this case, it is the tax 
sparing credit granted by Canada that reduces the Canadian tax base, not 
Chinese tax incentives.  
What if Canco carries on business in China through a wholly-owned 
subsidiary (a “foreign investment enterprise” under Chinese law)?166  Any 
business income earned by the Chinese subsidiary is not currently taxable 
in Canada. Because China is a “designated treaty country”, the dividends 
received by Canco qualify as “exempt dividends”, not taxable in Canada. 
China imposes no withholding tax on the dividend payments.167  As such, 
                                                 
165 If the individual shareholder is a resident, a dividend tax credit is available. If the 
shareholder is a non-resident, a withholding tax of 25 % (reduced by treaties) applies to 
the amount of dividends received. If the shareholder is a corporation or tax exempt entity 
(such as a pension fund), the dividends are not taxable. 
166 For Canadian income tax purposes, a Chinese FIE, other than a contractual joint 
venture that takes the form of a partnership or contractual arrangement, is generally 
characterized as a corporation. If a Canadian corporation owns 10% or more of the equity 
interest in an FIE, the FIE is a foreign affiliate. 
167 As long as the business income stays in a “corporate solution”, no Canadian tax is 
payable. The Canadian corporation excludes the dividends from the Chinese FIE under 
s.113(1)(a) of the ITA. If it pays dividends to another Canadian resident corporation, the 
inter-corporate dividends are tax-free under the ITA (s.121). 




the Chinese income can be repatriated to Canada without either Chinese or 
Canadian tax. When Canco distributes the dividends received from China 
to its shareholders, the shareholders (whether resident individuals or non-
resident) are liable to pay Canadian tax.168  The Canadian tax base could 
be  considered as being eroded to the extent of non-taxation of the Chinese 
business income when earned and when repatriated to Canco. However, 
such erosion is really caused directly by Canadian tax policy, not Chinese 
tax incentives. Canada chose to implement CIN by exempting Chinese 
business income from Canadian tax.   
What if Canco makes its investment in China through a wholly-owned 
subsidiary in a tax haven?  A popular tax haven for Canadian companies is 
Barbados. Assuming Canco establishes a foreign affiliate in Barbados 
(BFA) that qualifies as an International Business Corporation and taxable 
at the rate of 3%. BFA then invests in a Chinese FIE. The FIE qualifies for 
a tax holiday under Chinese tax incentives legislation and pays no Chinese 
income tax. After the expiration of the tax holiday, the FIE borrows 
money from BFA to expand operations. The interest expense is tax 
deductible in China.169  The interest received by BFA, although formally 
passive income from property subject to the anti-deferral rules170 (similar 
to the US SubPart F rules), is deemed to be active business income.171 
Because Barbados is a “designated treaty country”, the interest income is 
added to its exempt surplus, out of which exempt dividends can be paid to 
Canco. This tax structure is attractive to Canco because Canco can finance 
its operations in China by borrowing funds to subscribe shares of BFA and 
obtain “double dip” for the interest expense: once in China by the FIE, and 
                                                 
168 Canadian personal income tax is applicable to any capital gains realized by a resident 
shareholder. As such, to the extent that the gain is derived from the value of the Chinese 
business income, which is increased by the tax incentives, Canada can tax it. 
169 Interest paid to the BFA maybe subject to a Chinese withholding tax at the rate of 
10%. See China-Barbados Tax Treaty, Art.10, available at SAT website. 
170 Sections 91 and 95 of the Income Tax Act. Under the Canadian foreign accrual 
property income (FAPI) rules, a Canadian resident shareholder is currently taxable on the 
FAPI earned by a controlled foreign affiliate. The most important type of FAPI is foreign 
portfolio income. Dividends, interest, rents and royalties received by a tax haven affiliate 
from a related affiliate (i.e., a Chinese FIE) are generally deemed to be active business 
income, and thus excluded from FAPI. 
171 S.95(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
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again in Canada by Canco.172  This type of international double-dip was 
considered offensive to tax policy because the dividends are exempt from 
Canadian tax. But a recent proposal173 to end the double dip generated a 
storm of protest from business and tax professionals and had to be 
significantly narrowed down.  This illustrate the fundamental point that the 
erosion of Canadian tax base is the direct result of Canadian tax policy,174 
not Chinese.    
 
United States   The United States is also a credit country, but 
implements CEN largely in the case of foreign portfolio income. The 
United States has never granted a tax sparing credit to any developing 
country, including China.175 Foreign business income is taxable in the 
United States if earned directly by a United States corporation. Because of 
                                                 
172 In addition to using the Barbados affiliate as a financing vehicle, it can be used to hold 
valuable intangibles or channelling management fees. Royalties and management fees 
paid by the Chinese joint venture are deductible in China. Chinese withholding tax is zero 
on management fees and maximum of 10 % on royalties by virtue of the China-Barbados 
Tax Treaty. The Chinese source management fees and royalties are added to the 
Barbados affiliate’s “exempt surplus” out of which exempt dividends are paid. If 
Barbados were not a treaty country, the interest, royalty and management fees would go 
to a “taxable surplus” and only “taxable dividends” can be paid to the Canadian parent. 
So, in the case of Canadian companies, using a tax haven that has a treaty with China and 
Canada is extremely beneficial. 
173 See, Backgrounder, International Tax Avoidance and Tax Havens, published by the 
Department of Finance, Canada: http://www.fin.gc.ca/news07/data/07-041_2e.html.  
174 Canada has not attempted to amend the FAPI rules because of the policy concern for 
CIN and the competitiveness of Canadian multinationals. Territorial taxation of active 
business income is a fundamental principle in Canadian international tax law. Excluding 
interest, royalties and rents from FAPI is consistent with this principle as long as these 
payments are received from a related foreign affiliate that deducts the payments in 
computing its active business income. In other words, the origin of these payments is an 
active business and the business income should be taxed in the country where the 
business is carried on. 
175 See Karen B. Brown, Missing  Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules 
Accommodate Investment in Developing Countries? 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 45. at 78 
(2002); Paul D. Reese, Comment, United States Tax Treaty Policy Toward Developing 
Countries: The China Example, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 369 at 379 (1987). For further 
comments, see Laurey Damian, Note: Reexamining U.S. Tax Sparing Policy with 
Developing Countries: The Merits of Falling in Line with International Norms, 20 Va. 
Tax Rev. 467 (2000). 




the check-the-box rules,176 Chinese joint ventures may be checked as flow-
through entities.177  Foreign business income earned indirectly through a 
foreign affiliate is not currently taxable in the United States. Dividends 
received from such affiliate are taxable in the United States after a 
deduction for a direct and indirect foreign tax credit. There are 
proposals178 to replace the credit system with a territorial or exemption 
system, but they have not been adopted into law. 
 
Assuming a United States corporation, USCo, carries on business 
activities in China through a branch or permanent establishment and the 
Chinese income is exempted from Chinese tax. Under United States law, 
the Chinese income is currently taxable. USCo cannot claim any credit for 
the Chinese tax because there is no tax sparing credit available. USCo 
ends up paying United States tax on its Chinese income. 
 
If USCo carries on business in China through a Chinese FIE and treats the 
FIE as a corporation, the FIE’s business income is not currently taxable in 
the United States. When the FIE pays dividends to USCo, the dividends 
are free from Chinese withholding tax, but are taxable in the United States. 
Since there is no Chinese taxes paid and there is no tax sparing credit 
available, there is no direct or indirect foreign tax credit for Chinese taxes. 
The United States ends up taxing the Chinese income in full. As such, 
Chinese tax incentives clearly do not cause any base erosion in the United 
                                                 
176 Regs. Secs. 301.7701-2 
177 Pierre Maugue, Tax Incentives in the People’s Republic of China: Who Benefits? 5 
Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 155 (1997). 
178 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair and Pro-Growth: 
Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System (2005); and Staff of J. Comm. On Taxation, 108 
th Cong., Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures (2005).  
Earlier in 2005, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation suggested a similar shift on 
the basis of two arguments. First, the credit system allows deferral of US taxation of 
foreign earnings of US-owned foreign corporations, which distorts business decisions on 
where and how to invest these earnings (presumably the earnings are not repatriated to 
the US for tax reasons). Second, the credit system often allows US multinational 
corporations to achieve US tax results more favorable than they could obtain under an 
exemption system. For more comment, see Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why 
Some U.S. Multinationals May Be Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (and Some 
Ideas They Really Dislike), Vol.59 S.M.U. L. Rev. 751-72 (2006). 
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States. There are the benefits of deferral and averaging, but, as argued in 
the context of Canada, this is the result of US tax policy. The United 
States could disallow such benefits, but choose not to. 
 
If USCo invests in China through a tax haven subsidiary, the main tax 
advantage is the deferral of U.S. tax on the dividends and other payments 
received from the Chinese FIE.  As long as the income is outside the 
Subpart F regime, there is no immediate taxation of the tax haven 
subsidiary’s income. If the dividends, interest, royalties, and management 
fees were received from China directly by USCo, they would be currently 
taxable in the United States. It is thus not surprising that Luxembourg, 
Bermuda, Barbados, UK Caribbean Islands, and The Netherlands are 
among the countries with the largest US affiliate operations.179  Avoiding 
U.S. tax by American companies in such manner can hardly be blamed on 
Chinese tax incentives. The removal of Chinese tax incentives after 2007 
will unlikely change the investment pattern of American companies. 
To sum up, tax incentives in China result in non-taxation of income earned 
in China. They do not have the effect of eroding the tax base of the 
residence country. For an exemption country, this point is very clear.  If 
the residence country has a credit system, including a tax sparing credit, 
such as Canada, the conclusion is the same – Chinese tax incentives do not 
erode that country’s tax base against its wish.  If the residence country has 
a credit system without a tax sparing credit, such as the United States, the 
non-taxation in China is, in effect, a “gift of tax base” from China as it can 
tax Chinese income in full.  This analysis is the same whether FDI in 
China is made directly from the residence country or indirectly through a 
tax haven jurisdiction. Ultimately, the tax base of the residence country is 
eroded to the extent of tax deferral achieved, but it is the result of the 
domestic tax policy of the residence country.   
 
                                                 
179 See U.S. MNE Operations, 2003, reproduced in Kimberly A. Clausing and Reuven 
Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment (The Brookings Institution, June 2007). 




D. INTER-NATION EQUITY AND REDISTRIBUTION  
The issue of inter-nation equity and redistribution has received increasing 
attention in tax literature. Scholars have suggested that developed 
countries assist developing countries through tax sparing credits,180 
broader source-based tax jurisdiction through tax treaties,181 or amended 
domestic Subpart F rules.182 However, the inter-nation equity implications 
of the FDI tax incentives offered by developing countries have not been 
addressed much in literature. While formal redistribution from a high-
income country to low-income countries through the above mentioned 
measures remains theoretical, the implicit redistribution of tax base from a 
low-income country to high-income countries occurs whenever the former 
grants tax incentives to investors from the latter. A normative analysis of 
the effect of Chinese FDI tax incentives seems to indicate this.   
Inter-nation equity.   Inter-nation equity requires a fair allocation of the 
international tax base among countries.183  It is extremely difficult, if 
possible at all, to determine whether a country’s share of the international 
tax base is “fair” or “equitable”. The allocation may be considered to be 
equitable “if every country has the right to tax all profits having their 
                                                 
180 See Brown (2002), supra note 175. For a reply to Brown’s argument see McDaniel, 
supra note 57. See also Karen Brown, Transforming the Unilateralist into the 
Internationalist: New Tax Treaty Policy Toward Developing Countries in Karen B. 
Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, eds., TAXING AMERICA. New York: New York 
University Press, 1996, at 214.   
181 Kim Brooks, Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income 
Countries: A Comparison of Canada and Australia’s Policies, 5(1) eJournal of Tax 
Research (2007) (forthcoming) (suggesting a broadening of the source taxation over 
royalties as a means of helping developing countries); Allison Christians, Tax Treaties for 
Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 Brooklyn L. Rev. 639  
(2005) (US tax treaties have functioned ineffectively as a means for assisting low-income 
countries). 
182 McDaniel, supra note 57. 
183 See Peggy Musgrave, Tax Policy in the Global Economy, in STUDIES IN FISCAL 
FEDERALISM AND STATE-LOCAL FINANCE, UK 2002. For a review of this 
concept, see Jinyan Li, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN THE AGE OF 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. Toronto, Canadian Tax 
Foundation 2003, chapter 13. 
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source within its borders.”184 In the case of bilateral tax treaties, those that 
are based on the UN Model Tax Convention are generally considered 
more equitable to developing countries as they allow more source-based 
tax jurisdiction than the OECD Model Tax Convention.185  
 
The standard debate on inter-nation equity has little bearing on the 
analysis of FDI tax incentives granted by low-income countries as these 
countries “voluntarily” give up their tax base in the hope of enticing FDI.  
Nonetheless, the existence of these FDI specific incentives certainly 
worsens the inequity in the sharing of the tax base between the low-
income host country and the high-income home country.    
 
Inter-nation redistribution.  In a single-state context, equity generally 
requires redistribution of income by way of progressive taxation.186 In an 
inter-nation context, there is no similar mechanism for redistribution at the 
level of taxpayers. Globalization may have increased the need for inter-
nation redistribution.187  Indeed, “there appears to be no sound theoretical 
reason to restrict redistribution to members of any single tax 
jurisdiction.”188  However, inter-nation redistribution of income has not 
                                                 
184 A. Schafer and C. Spengel, The Impact of ICT on Profit Allocation within 
Multinational Groups: Arm’s Length Pricing or Formula Apportionment? Centre for 
European Economic Research, at ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0353.pdf. 
185 Alex Easson, INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM AND THE INTER-NATION 
ALLOCATION OF TAX REVENUE. Wellington, New Zealand: Victoria University 
Press, 1991, at 20.  
186 For more analysis of inter-individual equity, see Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: 
Measures in Search of a Principle, vol. 42, no.  National Tax J. 139 (1989); Paul R. 
McDaniel and James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow 
Exchange, vol. 1, no.  Fla. Tax Rev. 607 (1993); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. and Alic G. 
Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive Taxation, vol. 4, no. 1 
Fla. Tax  Rev. 1  (1998). 
187 See, for example, Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive 
Taxation, ’Globalization’, and the New Millennium (2000) vol. 4, no.  Fla. Tax Rev. 731. 
For a discussion of fairness in international taxation, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. 
Peroni, and Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case 
for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 301 (2001). 
188 See, for example, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and The Fiscal 
Crisis of the Welfare State, vol. 113, no.7 Harvard L. Rev. 1573-676 , at 1649 (2000). A 
similar sentiment was expressed by Easson (1991), supra note 185. 




been widely espoused, even among proponents of inter-nation equity.189 
No nation has ever made a genuine commitment to worldwide equity.190  In 
the absence of a world government, the fact remains that “the freedom and 
independence, as well as the economic welfare, of people varies from 
nation to nation.”191 It is not even considered desirable by some scholars to 
have a world government because it “would likely become a 
dictatorship.”192  
 
Under the current international tax regime, the tax sparing mechanism can 
be viewed as an instrument of redistribution as the home country foregoes 
the right to tax its residents on their foreign income. This mechanism has 
been recently scaled back by OECD countries on ground of abuse and 
potential for international non-taxation.193 In theory, an inter-nation 
redistribution system could be envisioned through the design of tax 
rates:194   
 
                                                 
189 For example, Nancy Kaufman argues that inter-nation equity should be the foundation 
of an equitable international tax system, but did not expand the concept to include inter-
country redistribution; see Equity Considerations in International Taxation, vol. 26, no.4 
Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 1465-70, at 1465 (2001). See also Kaufman, Fairness and the 
Taxation of International Income,  vol. 29. no. 2 Law & Policy in Int’l Business 145-203 
(1998). 
190 Graetz, supra note 159, at 1372. 
191 Ibid, at 1372-3. 
192 Ibid, at 1373. In this respect, Graetz cites John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999) and 
F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (1996). 
193 OECD TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION. OECD, Paris, 1998.  
194 Peggy B Musgrave and Richard A. Musgrave, Fiscal Coordination and Competition in 
an International Setting, in L. Eden, ed., RETROSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC FINANCE. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press (1991), 61-85, at 65-6; Inter-Nation Equity, in 
Richard M. Bird and John G. Head, eds., MODERN FISCAL ISSUES. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1972, 63-85; Peggy B. Musgrave, Interjurisdictional Equity 
in Company Taxation: Principles and Applications to the European Union, in Sijbren 
Cnossen, ed., TAXING CAPITAL INCOME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ISSUES 
AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, 47-77;  
Revisiting the Theory of International Income Taxation: Principal Paper: Sovereignty, 
Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation, vol.26, no.4 Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 
1335-1356  (2001).   
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For instance, the tax share in profits earned by non-
residents might be allowed to rise inversely to the level of 
per capita income in [source jurisdiction] and directly in 
relation to per capita income in [residence jurisdiction]. 
Such a scheme would be of particular interest in the 
relation between developed and developing countries.195 
 
Reverse redistribution. While the current international tax regime 
has no formal system of inter-nation redistribution, there is a de facto 
reverse redistribution as a result of the FDI tax incentives granted by low-
income countries. The extent of such reverse redistribution depends on 
who bears the burden of corporate income tax. “Unfortunately, after 
decades of analysis, no consensus exists on the incidence of the corporate 
tax”.196 In theory, three possible groups of individuals may ultimately bear 
the burden of corporate tax and thus reap the fruits of tax incentives: 
shareholders, workers, and customers.   
In the case of Chinese tax incentives available to FDI, two of the three 
groups of individuals are predominantly non-residents of China. Workers 
of FIEs are generally Chinese. They may benefit from tax incentives if 
part of the tax savings is shifted to them in the form of higher wages. 
There has been little evidence suggesting that FIEs have actually passed 
their tax savings to Chinese workers.  Low wages has been one of the 
factors attracting FDI to China in the first place.  Individual shareholders 
of companies investing in China are presumably resident in high-income 
OECD countries.197 FIEs that benefit from Chinese tax incentives export 
their products to mostly high-income countries, such as the United States, 
Japan, Germany, UK, and Canada. 198  In terms of per capita GPI (gross 
                                                 
195 Musgrave (2000), ibid., at 59. 
196 Avi-Yonah (2004), supra note 115, at 381. For a similar conclusion, see Roin (2001), 
supra note 115, at 575-8. 
197  Top exporters of FDI to China include Japan, the United States, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Korea, and Singapore.  Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China, 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/tongjiziliao/v/200706/20070604787959.html, visited 
on July 2, 2007.     
198  China’s top export destinations are: the United States (about 1/5 of all Chinese 
exports), Japan, Germany, The Netherlands, UK, France, Italy, Spain, Canada, South 




national income), the United States ranked 10th (US$44,970), Canada 
ranked 23rd (US$36,170), and China ranked 129 in the world in 2006 
(US$2,010).199  
To the extent that shareholders and customers of a multinational 
corporation that ultimately benefit from the Chinese tax incentives and 
residents in high-income countries, the tax base given up by China has 
been shifted to these individuals and their government.  Given that China 
is a low-income country, such shift of tax revenue is an upside down 
subsidy to a high-income country.200 This is perhaps the “price” China was 
willing to pay in order to attract FDI to China,201 but the fact remains that 
the redistribution puts the ability-to-pay principle on its head.  
Furthermore, it could be argued that the benefit of Chinese tax incentives 
is shifted to the government of capital-exporting countries. As discussed in 
the context of Canada and the United States, shareholders of companies 
investing in China are ultimately taxable in the residence country on 
dividends or capital gains from the sale of shares.202 To the extent that 
dividends or capital gains include the tax savings shifted from China, the 
residence country actually taxes the amount of tax foregone by China, 
resulting in an indirect shift of revenue from the China’s fisc to that of the 
                                                                                                                         
Korea, and Australia. See International Monetary Fund; General Administration of 
Customs (Beijing); reported in Time (July 9, 2007 at 26-7. 
199 See World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 1 July 2007: 
www.siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf.  
200 If the lost tax revenue must be made up by the Chinese government through reduced 
spending that would otherwise benefit Chinese citizens, each Chinese citizen theoretically 
gives up some revenue in favour of a richer person in a foreign country. 
201  Because the redistribution aspect of Chinese FDI incentives has not been discussed in 
China, there is no official statement that such reverse redistribution was intended by the 
Chinese government. It is safe to assume, though, that such intention did not exist in 1979 
when the first tax incentives for FDI were introduced. 
202 In the case of public companies, shareholders may be taxed when they sell the shares 
and realize capital gains. Consequently, business income earned in China that is eligible 
for Chinese tax incentives indirectly becomes part of the tax base of the residence country 
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residence country.203 Similar reverse redistribution is likely the outcome of 
FDI tax incentives granted by other developing Countries.     
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of the Chinese experience with FDI tax incentives, several 
conclusions can be made. First, FDI-specific tax incentives can be 
effective under the “right” conditions.  When the conditions change and 
foreign investment would have been made in any event, tax incentives 
became not only redundant, but also impediments to economic 
development.  Second, the efficiency of FDI-specific incentives is 
dependent on their effectiveness in attracting investment that can generate 
positive externalities. So, effective incentive measures are also efficient. 
However, when incentive measures encourage “round tripping” or other 
investment behaviours that have no positive externalities, they became 
inefficient.  Third, equity implications of FDI tax incentives have not 
received much consideration. Like many types of tax expenditures, FDI 
tax incentives tend to have the effect of reverse redistribution. This is 
arguably true at the international level: China and Chinese taxpayers give 
up tax revenue for the benefit of the government and residents of capital-
exporting countries.  Finally, on the issue of international harmful tax 
competition, the paper shows that FDI-specific tax incentives in China 
hardly erode the tax base of capital-exporting countries. The decision of 
OECD countries not to tax foreign business income on a current basis in 
the residence country gives effect to Chinese tax incentives. When a 
residence country decides not to tax business income earned in China, it is 
difficult to say that its tax base is eroded by China’s decision not to tax the 
income. If OECD countries collectively decide to currently tax foreign 
business income in order to protect their tax base,204  redistribution from 
developing countries to OECD countries would be more evident and 
                                                 
203 This could not have been intended as part of China’s foreign policy or development 
policy. For a capital exporting country, Graetz suggests that it is possible to consider 
redistribution internationally as a function of international tax policy (supra note 159, at 
309). 
204 See Avi-Yonah (2004), supra note 115 (suggesting a multilateral attack on tax 
competition to be led by the World Trade Organization). 




severe. Developing countries should rethink about their FDI tax policy and 
perhaps emulate China in abolishing tax incentives.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
